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1. In the beginning, there were prostitutes. Way back in the earliest days of human
history, there were no jobs because there was no division of labor; folks huddled together
in groups and focused primarily on getting enough to eat while avoiding being eaten. Over
time, with survival secured, certain occupational niches emerged. Conventional wisdom
has it that the first of these involved women willing to barter for sex. While it is unclear
exactly what profession came next-for colloquial speculation including a not-so-flattering
reference to politicians from former President Ronald Regan, see THE YALE BOOK OF
QUOTATIONS 629 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006) ("Politics is supposed to be the second
oldest profession. I have come to realize that it bears a very close resemblance to the
first.")-"keeping the village from getting plundered by marauding savages" seems to
have served as one of the basic organizational principles anthropologists have identified as
widely shared by our ancient ancestors, and so logical inferences suggest "highway
banditry" as a plausible candidate for second place. Defend a patch of land long enough
and you inevitably begin to think of it as your own; inchoate notions of private property
arise and inequality cracks the fagade of the utopian ideal of a classless society. Once we
stop sharing and start borrowing, lending emerges as the world's third-oldest profession,
and following in its immediate wake come the notion of debt, and the realization that
sometimes people don't pay so maybe it would be easier to hire somebody else to handle
the heavy lifting. Enter the debt collectors at number four.
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INTRODUCTION
Debt collectors are a necessary evil. Sometimes, they are also just
flat-out evil. In the 1970s, Congress wisely decided there should be
nationwide rules governing just exactly how evil debt collectors are
allowed to be. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act2 ("FDCPA")
provides safeguards against harassment and abuse, protecting the
sanity, dignity, and privacy of the debtor.3 Unfortunately, some of its
provisions have fallen into disrepair due to the passage of time, the
wonders of modern technology, and a lack of consistent guidance
from federal regulators. This Comment will (1) examine the
FDCPA's so-called "Voicemail Paradox" as an illustration of the
Act's shortcomings; (2) analyze the negative impact the law's current
state of disarray has on consumer privacy interests; and (3) ultimately
advocate that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB")
take an aggressive stance to resolve the Voicemail Paradox in a
manner that sends the right message to the collectors it regulates and
the public it protects by using its considerable rulemaking and
enforcement authority to categorically prohibit debt collectors from
leaving messages on a consumer's answering machine.
Part I sets the stage by foregrounding the issue of debt in twenty-
first century America, exploring its collection as a cultural
phenomenon. First, it introduces the reader to a real live American
debtor to illustrate how easy it is to get caught up in the collections
cycle and how unpleasant that process can be. Next, by employing the
2. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012).
3. See, e.g., Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1117 (10th Cir. 2002). As the court
explained,
The substantive heart of the FDCPA lies in three broad prohibitions. First, a "debt
collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to
harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt."
§ 1692d. Second, a "debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt." § 1692e.
Third, a "debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or
attempt to collect any debt." § 1692f. Violation of these standards subjects debt
collectors to civil liability, § 1692k, or administrative enforcement by the Federal
Trade Cnmmission .. ..
Id.
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film No Country for Old Men as a metaphor, it tracks the FDCPA's
evolution and decay.
Part II analyzes the Voicemail Paradox. Answering machines
were not in wide use at the time of the FDCPA's enactment, but
nowadays when consumers don't pick up their phones, collectors who
want to leave a message after the proverbial "beep" are faced with an
allegedly vexing conundrum. By complying with the Act's "mini-
Miranda" requirement 4-which mandates that collectors properly
identify themselves in all communications with consumers-they risk
violating the Act's prohibition on disclosing the existence of a debt to
an unauthorized third party if anyone other than the message's
intended recipient overhears it.' Collectors have complained since
2006 that this forces them into an untenable Hobson's choice,6 but
most courts have rejected such arguments, pointing out the dilemma
is largely self-imposed.'
After outlining the general trend, Part II focuses on Zortman v.
J. C. Christensen & Associates, Inc.,8 which shifts the issue into the
brave new world of cellphones, demonstrates the perils of the
inherently patchwork approach our federal judiciary's interpretation
of the FDCPA has taken, and (potentially) provides collectors
seeking an end-run around the Act with a map for future
malfeasance. A closer inspection of the provisions that trigger the
Voicemail Paradox suggests stronger privacy interests are at stake
than Zortman and collectors' advocates acknowledge. Both the
Paradox and the FDCPA as a whole reflect deep respect for the
American debtor's right to be let alone.' More broadly, telephone and
electronic communications are already heavily regulated by laws that
tilt in favor of consumer privacy interests.
Part III focuses on how the CFPB can resolve the Paradox. The
Bureau, which is uniquely insulated from regulatory capture and
Congressional meddling,"o recently inherited rulemaking and
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2012); see also id. § 1692d(6) (prohibiting phone calls
without revealing the caller's identity). For a more in-depth discussion of the mini-
Miranda requirement, see infra note 15. The phrase draws its name from the famed case,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. § 1692c(b).
6. See infra note 140.
7. See, e.g., Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 659-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
8. 870 F. Supp. 2d 694 (D. Minn. 2012).
9. See infra notes 301-08 and accompanying text for a discussion of how Professor
Prosser's famous turn of phrase taps into a fundamental American value.
10. See infra Part III.A.
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enforcement authority over the FDCPA." Reforming the Act is a tall
order, and the CFPB is still in the process of "standing up," but
collectors already seem to sense there is a new sheriff in town.
Utilizing its rulemaking and enforcement authority to clarify existing
regulations and update them to fit contemporary contexts by
declaring that debt collectors cannot leave voicemails, period, is well
within the Bureau's authority. Moreover, taking such a step would (1)
be in keeping with both the FDCPA's original intent and the vast
majority of case law, and (2) create a clear bright line rule to help
collectors avoid future violations while (re)establishing a broader
principle that could easily extend to cover whichever new
technological or social media platform innovative debt collectors find
most convenient for exploitation next time.
I. EVENING REDNESS IN THE WEST12
A. Horton Hears Harassment
"This is a call to collect a debt."" Josh Horton still remembers the
first time he answered the phone and heard those eight magic words.14
It was spring 2009, just after he defaulted on the student loans he
incurred while earning a J.D. from a private law school near
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The "mini-Miranda" provision of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act requires that collectors identify
themselves as such whenever they communicate with a debtor about
repaying what he owes.'" In the months that followed, Horton heard
11. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, §§ 1011, 1022, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964, 1980 (2010).
12. With apologies to Cormac McCarthy for borrowing the subtitle to his novel Blood
Meridian as well as for bastardizing the plot of No Country for Old Men, which was based
on his 2005 novel of the same name. See generally No COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN
(Paramount Vantage 2007); CORMAC MCCARTHY, No COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN (2005);
CORMAC MCCARTHY, BLOOD MERIDIAN, OR, THE EVENING REDNESS IN THE WEST
(1985).
13. Interview with Josh Horton, in Carrboro, N.C. (Sept. 25, 2012) [hereinafter
Horton Interview].
14. Id.
15. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(11), 1692d(6) (2012). As discussed in Part II.A, these two
FDCPA provisions mandate that debt collectors properly identify themselves in all
communications with a consumer. While the former is an anti-fraud measure, the latter is
geared towards preventing harassment. However, as Part II.D contends, both also protect
consumers' privacy rights. As for the origins of the "mini-Miranda" nickname, it gained
popularity amongst consumer advocates "because it bears similarities to the Miranda
rights that law enforcement must use to warn suspects of their right to remain silent, the
right to an attorney, and the right to a court-appointed attorney if the suspect cannot
afford one." What is the mini-Miranda?, MGJDLAW.COM, http://minimiranda.com/what-is-
the-mini-mirandal (last visited Jan. 3, 2014). The website is maintained by the Florida law
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them recited so frequently that eventually those eight magic words
seared themselves across the dark side of his memory, haunting his
dreams and inspiring a Pavlovian shudder every time his telephone
rang (which was often).1 6
Horton enrolled in law school in 2004, hoping to wait out a
stagnant job market by acquiring the sort of post-graduate, white-
collar skill set that so many thousands before him had translated into
financial security." Tuition bills were high, and the federally
guaranteed student loans available to him were not sufficient to cover
them, let alone the cost of living while he attended law school full-
time, and so he took out supplemental private loans from a
commercial provider to support himself, justifying it as an
"investment.""8 Remember, this was back in the days when so many
were lured to law school by the prospect of a six-figure starting
salary.19 In retrospect, such rose-tinted delusions seem as ill-founded
as the then-conventional wisdom that housing prices would never fall,
but at the time these assumptions were widely held as Gospel truth-
for decades, millions of Americans had staked their futures on both,
and for many if not most, the gamble seemed to pay off.20 Horton was
one of the folks who found themselves stuck without a chair when the
music finally stopped.
As with many other facets of the U.S. economy, the legal market
was already faltering by the time Horton graduated in 2007.21 He
firm Greenwald Davidson PLLC, which specializes in representing consumer plaintiffs in
FDCPA complaints.
16. Horton Interview, supra note 13.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at
BU1, BU6 (examining the struggles recent law school graduates have encountered in
obtaining gainful employment and repaying their student loans).
20. See id. Segal's reporting emphasizes how fundamental shifts in the legal job
market, combined with ever-escalating tuition rates, have undermined what was once
widely viewed as a path towards prosperity, leaving thousands of recent law school
graduates struggling to find gainful employment and pay off their student loan debts. For a
broader view of how debt has historically driven the American economy at the macro-
level while also functioning at the individual level as a tool for upward social mobility, see
generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010);
ROBERT E. WRIGHT, ONE NATION UNDER DEBT: HAMILTON, JEFFERSON, AND THE
HISTORY OF WHAT WE OWE (2008); Jackson Lears, The American Way of Debt, N.Y.
TIMES (June 11, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/11/magazine/11wwlnlede.html
?pagewanted=all&_r=0. As Lears notes, "[d]ebt has always played an important role in
Americans' lives-not merely as a means of instant gratification but also as a strategy for
survival and a tool for economic advance." Id.
21. See Amir Efrati, Hard Case: Job Market Wanes for U.S. Lawyers, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 24, 2007, at Al ("The majority of law-school graduates are suffering from a supply-
[Vol. 92630
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eventually found a job with a small firm near North Carolina's
Research Triangle, but business was slow and his salary was based on
commissions; before long, Horton was faced with the choice between
paying his bills or the interest payments on his loans.' When he chose
the former, his provider turned his account over to a debt collection
agency; Horton's phone started ringing shortly thereafter.23 At first,
the agency called him at home. The conversations started off polite
but quickly turned hostile. When negotiations proved fruitless,
Horton grew frustrated2 4 and eventually stopped answering his home
phone altogether. So then the agency called his firm's office. The
FDCPA bars collectors from contacting debtors at work against their
will," but despite Horton's protests, the calls continued, sometimes as
many as four per day, often utilizing caller-ID scrambling technology
to disguise their source.26 By Horton's recollection, these calls were
more akin to schoolyard lunch-money bullying than cordial
discussions about shared interests and mutually beneficial outcomes.27
They soon became a source of contention with his employer. Horton
eventually left the firm, further undermining his ability to repay his
debts.' Desperate for work, he set up a solo practice and started
taking on consumer protection cases, hoping to help others avoid his
plight.29 When the collectors finally quit calling, the creditor sued him
in state court.30 Horton filed a counterclaim for violations of the
FDCPA and added the debt collector as a party.3' The odds against
and-demand imbalance that's suppressing pay and job growth. The result: Graduates who
don't score at the top of their class are struggling to find well-paying jobs to make
payments on law-school debts that can exceed $100,000.").
22. See Horton Interview, supra note 13.
23. Id.
24. Id. Nobody enjoys coming home from a hard day at the office only to spend his
leisure time explaining to debt collectors why he was incapable of paying as much as they
wanted as soon as they wanted it.
25. Id. The FDCPA prohibits collectors from communicating with a consumer at
times and places they know are inconvenient. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c (2012). Specifically, if
informed that a consumer's employer prohibits such contacts, the collector violates the
FDCPA if he continues to call the consumer at work. Id. Moreover, consumers can cut off
all contact by sending a cease and desist notice in writing. Id.
26. See Horton Interview, supra note 13. Caller-ID scrambling is especially useful






31. Id. Horton's counterclaims also included causes of action under the U.S.
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012); the North Carolina Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-70-90 (2011); the North Carolina
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his prevailing at trial were steep: while the collection agency had
ignored his protests by calling him repeatedly at work (and also left
several messages on his home answering machine that likely violated
the FDCPA's so-called Voicemail Paradox, discussed in Part II),
Horton was then unfamiliar with the requirements for triggering the
protections the Act provides debtors.3 2 "And if I spent three years in
law school,". he laments, "then how is the average American
consumer supposed to know?"33 Horton eventually settled his case,
which gives his saga a happy ending, but his broader point remains no
less salient: most debtors do not share his insider's knowledge of the
legal system and for them, things do not always work out so
fortuitously.
B. Understanding Debt Collection and the FDCPA, with a Little
Help from Hollywood
No Country for Old Men is a blood-drenched epic, half-Western
and half-"take-the-money-and-run" chase movie.34 It is also the best
way to understand the American debt collection industry and the
current state of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, which was
enacted in 1977 to protect consumers against harassment, abuse, and
invasions of privacy by debt collectors.
No Country for Old Men opens in a usually quiet stretch of
Texas Hill Country, where a Vietnam veteran named Llewellyn
Moss happens across the remnants of a drug deal gone horribly
awry while hunting. Moss discovers a suitcase full of cash amidst
all the bodies and bloodshed. He sees an opportunity to improve
Telephone Solicitation Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-101 (2011); and North Carolina law
regarding invasion of privacy, negligence, and wanton and intentional conduct.
32. See Horton Interview, supra note 13. These days, when Horton explains he had no
idea he should have saved those messages or mailed a written cease-and-desist notice to
his telephonic antagonizers, he takes some solace in the irony of how few of his colleagues
actually practice what they preach, noting "[i]n our own lives, we lawyers almost never
follow the advice we give our clients." Id.
33. Id.
34. No COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN, supra note 12. This may well be the first spoiler
alert the North Carolina Law Review has ever published. Nonetheless, any readers who
have not yet seen the film and do not want to know the details of its plot are hereby
advised to stop reading now.
35. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012)).
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his lot in life, and he takes a risk by seizing what does not belong
to him. The year is 1980.36
For our purposes, Moss represents the American consumer.
America has always been a nation built on risk; the concept is
inherent in the act of crossing an ocean, or settling a frontier, or
starting a business. Throughout our nation's history, American
consumers have likewise embraced risk, utilizing debt as a tool for
social mobility. Indeed, in many respects, the post-World War II
American ideal was fueled by mortgages, credit cards, and student
loans. If the American Dream is best understood as a gamble, then a
defaulted debt is basically the result of a wager that did not work out.
Debtor delinquency rates fluctuate based on broader economic
trends, and since the start of the Great Recession and the collapse of
the job market, an awful lot of bets have gone badly." In 2009,
Americans owed $2.5 trillion in consumer debt.39 These debts came
from home loans and credit cards; while some consumers lived
beyond their means, others could barely make ends meet or afford to
pay for unanticipated healthcare costs. By 2011, thirty million
Americans-nearly fourteen percent of adults-owed debts subject to
collections processes.'
Unsurprisingly, the Mexican drug cartel whose money Moss took
decides they would like it returned. The film's plot thus revolves
around Moss's quest to escape the Lone Star State as he himself
is hunted by a ruthless hitman called Anton Chigurh, who has to
rank high on the all-time list of memorably menacing cinematic
villains. Chigurh inhabits the screen like an angel of death,
36. See No COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN, supra note 12; CORMAC MCCARTHY, No
COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN (2005). Throughout this Comment, the italicized text
summarizes the plot of both the film and the novel it was based on.
37. See LEWIS, supra note 20; WRIGHT, supra note 20; Lears, supra note 20.
38. 1 ROBERT J. HOBBS, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, FAIR DEBT
COLLECTION 3 (7th ed. 2011) [hereinafter NCLC].
39. Id. As the NCLC statistics illustrate, residential and credit debt have skyrocketed
since the economic crisis of 2008. In 2006, only 1.12% of residential loans were considered
delinquent, as were 2.21% of credit debts; by 2009, those figures escalated to 9.1% and
6.52%, respectively. Id. According to the NCLC, debts are considered "delinquent" after
thirty days. Id.
40. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2012: FAIR DEBT
COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 4 (2012) [hereinafter CFPB], available at http://files
.consumerfinance.gov/f/201203 efpbFDCPA annual report.pdf.
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ruthlessly murdering cops, drug dealers, innocent civilians, and
anybody else who stands between him and the money.41
When a consumer debt goes delinquent, a creditor may attempt
to collect on its own, sometimes using an in-house or subsidiary
collection divisions to seek payment via mail or telephone.42 If that
fails, the creditor will usually "charge off the account,"4 3 and send it to
a third-party collection agency for further pursuit and/or legal
action." Some debt collectors work on contingency, contracting with
creditors to collect the debt before a designated period of time
elapses in return for a percentage of the amount collected.45 Other
collectors, known as debt buyers, purchase (old and difficult to
collect) consumer debts outright at steep discounts-usually for
pennies on the dollar-and can then attempt to collect or sue.46
Scholars have noted that debt collectors frequently find themselves
stuck in a variation on the classic prisoner's dilemma.47 Debtors often
41. See No COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN, supra note 12. In the film, the cartel nearly
catches Moss when he foolishly returns to the scene of the massacre to give a dying man a
drink of water. Id. While this event triggers the chase that forms the plot, it is noteworthy
that the cartel also hid a transponder/tracking device inside that briefcase full of money,
which was pretty high-tech for 1980-Moss was always going to be a marked man, doomed
whether he knew it or not by a technology he was unaware existed. See id. As will be seen,
there is a certain degree of symmetry here between the film's plot and the evolution of the
debt collection industry, as well as the FDCPA's gradual decay.
42. FED. TRADE COMM'N, COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS: THE CHALLENGES OF
CHANGE, A WORKSHOP REPORT 2 (Feb. 2009) [hereinafter FTC], available at http://www
.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/debtcollection/dcwr.pdf.
43. "At any stage of the debt collection process, the creditor may 'write' or 'charge'
the debt off for its tax and accounting purposes . NCLC, supra note 38, at 18. Once
charged off, a debt "is no longer carried as an asset of value on the company's books." Id.
at 19. However, that does not mean the debt is cancelled. "Collection efforts continue on
many charged-off debts for a substantial amount of time after it is charged off. Any
payment on the charged-off debt is then treated as income-a recovery on a bad debt-on
the creditor's books." Id.
44. FTC, supra note 42, at 3.
45. Id. (explaining the various collection agencies and modes of compensation).
46. Id. at 4 ("Debt buyers generally pay 5% or less of the amount owed....").
47. See generally Winton E. Williams, Resolving the Creditor's Dilemma: An
Elementary Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Causes and Cures of Counterproductive
Practices in the Collection of Consumer Debt, 48 FLA. L. REv. 607 (1996). Game theorists
use the term "prisoner's dilemma" to describe situations where information deficits
undermine the capacity of rational actors to cooperate in pursuit of mutually beneficial
goals. Id. Professor Williams explains how even though it is usually in both the debtor's
and the collector's best interests to reach a settlement, information deficits between the
parties, exacerbated by structural changes in the collection industry-namely, increased
competition from new collection agencies entering the field, which has evolved from local
to regional to national in scope-have increased the adversarial nature of the typical
collector/debtor relationship, thus lowering the chances of a mutually beneficial outcome
while raising transaction costs. Id. at 620, 627-29.
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owe money to more than one creditor, and different creditors turn to
different agencies to collect. 48 This creates an incentive for abuse by
individual collection agencies that compete against one another for
whatever funds are available to repay what is owed,49 a dynamic that
is furthered by collectors' and creditors' desire to avoid the costs of
litigation, which in the case of consumer debts often exceeds the
amount owed. 0
The character of Anton Chigurh fits well within a broader
narrative archetype debt collectors have long occupied in American
popular culture. If popular culture emerges from the intersection of
art, politics, and life as actually lived, and if the American Dream is
fundamentally a gamble-one that, as recent years illustrate, can be
lost with catastrophic results-it makes sense that so many classic
Hollywood plots and protagonists are implicitly or overtly motivated
by debts and/or fear of men who collect them." Meanwhile, collectors
(and their narrative stand-ins, like Anton Chigurh) embody a
combination of relentlessness, rugged outlaw cool, and unflinching
amorality-silver screen shadows lurking on the dark side of the
American Dream to prey upon those who fall short.52
48. See id. at 616-26.
49. See id. at 626 (arguing that insistent creditors are often paid first).
50. See id. at 649 (discussing the fees and court costs associated with a bankruptcy
proceeding).
51. Think for a moment about why Jimmy Stewart stepped out on that ledge in It's A
Wonderful Life, and why Han Solo joined forces with the rebel alliance to hide from Jabba
the Hutt in Star Wars, and what it is the iconic antiheroes played by Samuel L. Jackson
and John Travolta actually do for their employer in Pulp Fiction. See IT'S A WONDERFUL
LIFE (Liberty Films (II) 1946); STAR WARS: EPISODE IV: A NEW HOPE (Twentieth
Century Fox 1977); PULP FICrION (Miramax 1994).
52. See, for example, the aforementioned characters played by Jackson and Travolta
in Pulp Fiction, or the repo men protagonists of the 1984 cult classic Repo Man, starring
Harry Dean Stanton and Emilio Estevez as glorified thieves who live the high life brazenly
snatching cars for cash before stumbling into an Roswell/Area 51-style alien cover-up by
the United States government. See PULP FICrION, supra note 51; REPO MAN (Edge City
1984). Interestingly, this was not the only time the repossession industry was mined as
narrative ground for science fiction. The 2010 similarly titled, but unrelated, film Repo
Men is set in a dystopian future where collectors seize debtors' internal organs as collateral
for their defaulted loans (ironically, this film lost its studio fourteen million dollars). See
REPO MEN (Universal Pictures 2010); Box Office/Business for Repo Men, IMDB (Apr. 22,
2010), http://www.imdb.com/title/ttl053424/business?ref_=tt dt bus (noting an estimated
budget of thirty-two million dollars while grossing approximately eighteen million dollars
worldwide). On the other hand, Rocky offers a notable contrast to Hollywood's typical
representation of collectors: before becoming a professional boxer the hero worked as a
debt collector-with-a-heart-of-gold, which (given the contrast) is clearly intended to reflect
his strong moral character and engender sympathy from the audience for his tale of
underdog triumph. See ROCKY (Chartoff-Winkler Productions 1976).
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With the collection industry booming in recent years," it seems
only natural then that debt collectors would come to play a more
prominent role in American film and television. As has been clear
ever since [insert whichever reality television program you, the
reader, personally find most egregiously repugnant here], the
American viewing public will watch practically anything. The Great
Recession spawned two new TV shows that thematically revolve
around the collection industry. Operation Repo54 dramatically
reenacts the real life stories of repo-men who seize the automobiles of
insolvent debtors. There are stakeouts and elaborate undercover
ruses, chase scenes and confrontations, unsympathetic deadbeats and
hardworking blue-collar "heroes" who are just doing their jobs. Repo
Gamesss adopts a classic game show quiz format, with a twist: the
hosts are actual repo-men, and the contestants are the defaulted
debtors whose possessions will be seized at the end of the program
unless they answer enough trivia questions correctly. Presumably to
make up for their low production values, both these programs offer a
healthy dose of schadenfreude, inviting viewers to delight in the
comeuppance of the deadbeat "villains" whose self-entitled
recklessness (partially) wrecked the country's economy.56
53. See NCLC, supra note 38, at 3. As reflected in both NCLC's statistics and the
CFPB's 2012 annual FDCPA report, there is a strong (and obvious) correlation between
our country's recent recession and the number of consumer debt defaults, which in turn
has resulted in an uptick in the volume of debts the collection industry handles. See id.;
CFPB, supra note 40. Of course, as seen below, that does not always translate into
increased profits for all collectors: while larger agencies have certainly benefited, smaller
operations often find the problem with an increase in volume is that-for the exact same
structuralleconomic reasons-many of their new targets have no money whatsoever to pay
them with.
54. Operation Repo (truTV 2008-2013).
55. Repo Games (Spike TV 2010-2013).
56. There are strong--parallels between the premises of these shows and public
resentment fueled since the crash by conservative arguments blaming debtors rather than
the lenders that enabled them. Perhaps the most infamous example of the latter came in
2009 when CNBC host Rick Santelli indignantly asked his audience, "How many of you
people want to pay for your neighbor's mortgage that has an extra bathroom and can't pay
their bills?" CNBC Business News (CNBC television broadcast Feb. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6XkjyKfLZTI. For a generally insightful discussion of
this rhetorical strategy, see Paul Krugman, Mugged by the Moralizers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
31, 2010, at A33. Obviously, the Great Recession has injured millions of Americans who
have worked hard every day of their lives and never had a dime drawn against their names
in the lender's ledger. It is in no way surprising that some of these people might feel
slightly resentful about all this, nor is it particularly shocking that politicians and pundits
would take note and pander accordingly by making scapegoats out of easy targets. In a
similar vein, it seems reasonable to posit that there is a certain kind of American television
viewer who might enjoy programs like Operation Repo and Repo Games. For many
viewers, shows like these presumably function in much the same way as shows like COPS
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Of course, the life of a debt collector is not nearly as glamorous
as what you might see on television. The collection industry currently
employs nearly 130,000 people, the majority of whom are paid low
wages, often supplemented by salary incentives that increase based on
how much they actually collect." The average collector spends most
of her time in an office cubicle, placing between 44 and 142 calls per
day, often reading from pre-approved scripts that guide them through
what are usually not pleasant conversations."
In a recent magazine article, 9 reporter Jake Halpern profiles
"Jimmy," a former cocaine-dealer-turned-debt collector in Buffalo,
New York,' to provide a revealing glimpse into the everyday world
of small-time debt collectors.61 Jimmy's collection agency, located in a
former karate academy in a rough neighborhood, purchases old,
uncollected accounts from debt brokers and at any given time
employs between three and ten people as "point callers" who spend
long hours tracking down delinquent debtors.62 Jimmy notes that it is
often difficult to find and keep good employees; the job is boring and
pays poorly, and sometimes he is forced to fire workers who push too
far and violate state or federal law in their overzealous collection
efforts.63
While Jimmy prides himself on following the law-"we're
professional nags, not con men""-his preferred tactics for dealing
and Judge Judy, restoring law and order while simultaneously defining, demonizing, and
punishing the "bad guys" for their moral failures. See COPS (20th Century Fox Television
1989-2013); Judge Judy (Worldvision Enterprises 1996-2013). Like the hapless carjacker
or the neighbor who cannot control her pet poodle, the debtor is presented as a social
pariah to be cut back down to size for the audience's amusement.
57. See NCLC, supra note 38, at 7.
58. Id. at 6-7. For more information on the sorts of scripts collectors use and the
strategies that go into producing them, see Robert M. Thamish, Six Tips for Making
Collection Calls that Get Results, CREDIT-TO-CASH-ADVISOR.COM (Oct. 23, 2012),
http://www.credit-to-cash-advisor.com/Articles/Collections/CollectionCalls.
59. Jake Halpern, Pay Up: A Debt Collector Struggles to Stay Out of Debt, THE NEW
YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, at 60.
60. Halpern notes that Buffalo was hit so hard by the economic crisis that in 2010,
debt collection was among its few remaining profitable industries, which is why the city
boasted more debt collectors than "taxi-drivers, bakers, butchers, steel workers, roofers,
crane operators, hotel clerks, and brick masons combined." Id.
61. Id. at 60-67.
62. Id. at 62.
63. Id. at 66. For example, Jimmy's company faced several lawsuits for violations a
former employee committed. Id. at 65. The article further describes a common (illegal)
practice employed by Buffalo's collectors: falsely threatening to have debtors arrested,
implying that police are en route to their homes and afterwards their children will be
taken away by social service agencies. Id.
64. Id. (quotation omitted).
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with debtors are manipulative and at times cross into (or over) legal
grey areas. Halpern describes a typical collection call in which Jimmy
adopts a tough tone with an alleged debtor, interrupting her attempts
to explain her situation by bluntly informing her what she owes and
what will happen if she does not pay.65 Eventually, the debtor works
herself into a frenzy, at which point Jimmy abruptly hangs up and
predicts she will call back soon.' Indeed, within moments she does. 7
Another employee then picks up the phone and begins to play the
role of the "good guy" who is actually trying to help her avoid the
higher fees she will have to pay the bank and its lawyers if a lawsuit
ensues. 68 The employee nearly succeeds in convincing her to pay,
although the call ends when she eventually admits she simply does
not have the money.69
Chigurh is not the only man searching for Moss. The local
sheriff Ed Tom Bell, has served the tiny patch of Texas where
the story begins for decades. He has seen it all, knows every trick
in the book, but is nearing retirement. When he realizes Moss-
one of the citizens he swore an oath to protect-took the money
and is being pursued by a bloodthirsty killer, he decides to track
them both down.70
Debt collectors perform a critical role in helping the American
consumer credit market function properly. "By collecting delinquent
debt, collectors reduce creditors' losses from non-repayment and
thereby help to keep consumer credit available and potentially more
affordable to consumers."" For millions of American consumers,
"[a]vailable and affordable credit is vital ... because it makes it
possible for them to purchase goods and services that they could not
65. Id. at 64.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. Later, Halpern interviews a collector at a different agency who reveals a
similar strategy she deployed when attempting to collect a debt from a disabled veteran.
Id. at 67. The collector explained, "[Y]ou have to empathize with debtors but not have
sympathy, because if you have sympathy you don't get paid." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
69. Id. at 65. This turns out to be a persistent problem for Jimmy's collection agency;
while the overall number of delinquent debts has risen dramatically since 2008, the
economic recession and weak job market have meant that many of those debtors simply
cannot pay. As a result, Jimmy often has a hard time coming up with sufficient funds to
meet his weekly payroll. Id. at 66-67.
70. See No COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN, supra note 12.
71. See CFPB, supra note 40, at 4.
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afford if they had to pay the entire cost at the time of purchase."7 2 In
short, debt collectors are a necessary evil.
But, as Congress realized in the 1970s, sometimes they are also
just plain evil. In 1977, Congress passed the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act to combat rampant abuses by debt collectors.7 4 By
"establish[ing] general standards of proscribed conduct, defin[ing]
and restrict[ing] abusive collection acts ... and provid[ing] specific
rights for consumers," the Act protects consumers against
"invasion[s] of privacy, harassment, abuse, false or deceptive
representations, and unfair or unconscionable collection methods"
while also insuring that honest collectors who actually do play by the
rules are not disadvantaged." The Act specifically defines who
qualifies as a debt collector 76 and generally imposes strict liability
72. Id.
73. See S. REP. No. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696.
The Senate Committee Report
found that debt collection abuse by third party debt collectors is a widespread and
serious national problem. Collection abuse takes many forms, including obscene or
profane language, threats of violence, telephone calls at unreasonable hours,
misrepresentation of a consumer's legal rights, disclosing a consumer's personal
affairs to friends, neighbors, or an employer, obtaining information about a
consumer through false pretense, impersonating public officials and attorneys, and
simulating legal process.
Id.
74. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012)). The Act is in keeping with America's
history of treating debt as a tool for social mobility and protecting debtors. The United
States is something of an outlier in this regard. See Andrew J. Duncan, From
Dismemberment to Discharge: The Origins of Modern American Bankruptcy Law, 100
COM. L.J. 191 (1995). Duncan notes that laws mandating harsh treatment for insolvent
debtors may well be as old civilization itself: the Code of Hammurabi authorized selling
debtors and their families into slavery; the Romans' famous Twelve Tablets allowed
creditors to "divide" a debtor's body limb-from-limb amongst themselves to recoup their
lost assets. Id. at 211-12. In sharp contrast with that historical backdrop, American
colonists abolished the English practice of indefinitely imprisoning insolvent debtors
under harsh conditions like hostages held for ransom. Id. at 212-13. Moreover, throughout
the eighteenth century, the institution of indentured servitude provided a platform upon
which aspiring immigrants could build better lives for themselves and their children. See,
e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Law and Indentured Servitude in Mideighteenth Century
Pennsylvania, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 69, 75 (1991). By the dawn of the twentieth
century, Congress had passed legislation enabling the legal discharge of defaulted debts
via bankruptcy. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
75. NCLC, supra note 38, at 93 (summarizing the FDCPA provisions of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) offers a broad definition, specifying the Act regulates "any
person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business
the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or
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against those who violate its provisions governing how and when they
are permitted to communicate with consumers.7 7 Violations are
judged against the "least sophisticated consumer"7 standard, which
reflects the FDCPA's aim of protecting "all consumers, the gullible as
well as the shrewd."" The Act provides aggrieved consumers with a
right of action in federal court, with a statutory remedy of $1,000 plus
whatever actual damages are incurred, as well as attorney's fees in
order to encourage lawyers to take on cases that would otherwise not
be lucrative.o For our purposes, Sheriff Bell represents the FDCPA.
Yet Sheriff Bell is always at least one step behind in his quest to
save Moss from Chigurh. His monologue during the film's
opening scenes makes clear that he is the last of a dying breed of
old-school lawmen. He fondly remembers the days when the
cops in these parts seldom even needed to carry a sidearm, and
he is wary of the newly ascendant brand of hyper-violent bad
guys who populate the film's plot. In other words: he's lost a step,
and he knows it. But nothing in his years of service has prepared
him for the likes of Chigurh, who seems practically supernatural
in surviving several serious injuries throughout the course of the
plot. He kills with a ruthless, almost mechanical, efficiency and
speaks in aphoristic riddles about fate and the folly of man's
ambition and the inevitability of all lives ending in loss. As the
chase unfolds, numerous supporting characters expire shortly
after crossing his path, felled by a weapon nobody's ever seen
before.8 '
attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due
another." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012).
77. NCLC, supra note 38, at 171. However, while strict liability is the norm, several
FDCPA provisions specifically include an intent requirement. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692d(5). The Act also provides a bona fide error defense that exempts collectors from
liability if they can show their alleged violation "was not intentional and resulted from a
bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to
avoid any such error." Id. § 1692k(c).
78. Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993) (explaining that district
courts and all federal appellate courts have adopted the standard).
79. Id. As the Second Circuit has explained, "the test is how the least sophisticated
consumer-one not having the astuteness of a 'Philadelphia lawyer' or even the
sophistication of the average, everyday, common consumer-understands [the collector's
challenged conduct or communication]." Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir.
1996).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. If the collectors demonstrate the suit was filed in bad faith, the
Act requires plaintiffs to pay the collector's attorney's fees. Id.
81. See No COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN, supra note 12.
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Nowadays, collectors, consumer advocates, and federal
regulators all agree that the FDCPA was written to fit the context of
the 1970s. It has not been meaningfully updated since then, and it is
woefully outdated on account of crucial shifts the last three and one-
half decades have produced in the industry's relevant players and
their methods of collection.' When Congress passed the FDCPA,
most collection agencies were relatively small, local(ish) operations
working on contingency, contacting consumers mostly through mail
or by dialing their telephone numbers individually and engaging in
live conversations 3 Since then, however, the number of collection
agencies has grown--6,500 by 2007-many of which have expanded
vastly in size and scope.' Some benefited from contracts with the
federal government, while others took advantage of creditors
downsizing their internal collection departments." By 1990, the top
six collection firms in the United States handled almost a third of the
nation's debts."
Moreover, there are now entire law firms dedicated to collecting
debts. In 2006, those firms posted nearly $1.2 billion in revenues.
Many of these firms take work from creditors on contingency,
receiving a percentage of what they collect at trial for their services.
Others purchase debts outright, and some function like de facto
collection agencies, employing paralegals as collectors in addition to
the lawyers who file suits against delinquent debtors in state courts.89
Consumer advocates point out that despite the FDCPA's protections
against abuse and the right of action it offers, the Act does little to
assist consumers when they are the ones being sued; moreover,
collection law firms often provide insufficient notice of these suits and
otherwise exploit consumers' ignorance of their rights and the legal
82. See FTC, supra note 42, at 1. The FTC workshop, "Collecting Consumer Debts:
The Challenges of Change," brought together players from all sides of the collection
industry for their input on how best to update the FDCPA's rules and protections in light
of these shifts. Id.
83. Id. at 15 (explaining the costs of debt collection).
84. See NCLC, supra note 38, at 7.
85. See id.
86. For a glimpse inside life at a sleek corporate collection firm, see Halpern, supra
note 59, at 67. Halpern pays a visit to the offices of a typical big money collector called
Northstar, which works on consignment for major credit card companies. Id. at 66.
Northstar reported 2010 as a record-breaking year, with profit increases of thirty-five to
forty percent. Id. at 67.
87. NCLC, supra note 38, at 8.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 9.
2014] 641
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
process generally. 90 As a result, the vast majority of consumer
collection suits are ineffectively contested and result in default
judgments in favor of the collectors, who are then able to seize the
consumer's property or garnish wages in order to satisfy the debt."
In a similar vein, the practice of debt-buying has increased
exponentially since the Act's passage, which consumer advocates
caution has increased the potential for abuse.92 Instead of working on
contingency for creditors, debt buyers purchase the debt outright for
a fraction of its value after the creditor writes it off as a loss.93 Often,
these delinquent debts are several years old, most have already been
assigned for collection (without success) to multiple agencies before
they are purchased, and sometimes have already been paid off in
full.94 Debt buyers tend to be more persistent in their attempts to
collect, but they frequently lack crucial verification information and
legal paperwork, which consumer advocates contend only furthers the
potential for harassment and abuse. 95
Technological innovation has further transformed the industry.
On the one hand, collectors now utilize call centers with sophisticated
computer databases and predictive dialers to track down consumers
with increased efficiency.96 Social media and internet phone
directories make debtors easier to locate, while automated systems
using predictive dialers
determine the number of calls to make based on the time of
day, the number of collectors logged on to the system, and the
average length of time collectors speak with consumers ...
[thereby] permit[ting] debt collectors to be far more productive
[by] eliminat[ing] the time spent dialing and waiting for a
consumer to answer.
90. Id. at 6.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 8.
93. Id.
94. For an entertaining insider's explanation of debt-buying, see Halpern, supra note
59, at 62. The accounts are commonly referred to as "papers," which vary widely in
quality. Id. "Fresh" papers are sold to large, established collectors by major credit issuers;
they cost more but generally have a higher rate of successful collection. Id. "Scummy"
papers often come from payday lenders; these are cheaper but typically for smaller
amounts that are more difficult to collect because the debtors are more likely to be totally
insolvent; often they are resold to multiple collection agencies simultaneously. Id.
95. See NCLC, supra note 38, at 11 (describing scenarios in which debt buyers
attempted to collect from debtors who already paid back what was owed).
96. See FTC, supra note 42, at 16.
97. Id. A 2005 survey conducted by the collector and creditor lobbying group ACA
International: The Association of Credit and Collection Professionals ("ACA
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On the other hand, consumers have embraced new communication
technologies-such as cell phones, answering machines, and social
media-that Congress had no way of anticipating when it passed the
FDCPA in 1977. These modern technologies make it easier to
communicate with consumers, but that convenience comes at a cost to
both sides. Consumer advocates warn these new methods also
increase the chances for illegal abuse and harassment by
unscrupulous collectors." Meanwhile, collectors contend that the real
risk of harassment is from crooked plaintiffs' lawyers aggressively
targeting while at the same time exposing collectors who play by the
rules to liability for technical violations of outdated laws. 99
In a typical Western, when the old sheriff is ailing, a new sheriff
rides into town to take his place. In No Country for Old Men,
the most logical candidate to replace Ed Tom Bell as the
embodiment of law and order is a bounty hunter named Carson
Wells. He enters the story midway through, visiting Moss in the
hospital as he recovers from a gun battle with Chigurh,
promising to protect him in exchange for the money. Wells is a
decorated veteran, a proud hero who lives by his own code, but
he is also arrogant, and he eventually gets lazy, lets his guard
down, and that is what gets him killed by Chigurh. Just before
pulling the trigger, Chigurh asks him a cold-blooded and
existentially harrowing question, "If the rule you followed
brought you to this, of what use was the rule?" Wells wilts, begs,
dies. The phone rings and it's Moss; we never know why he is
calling-perhaps to accept Wells's offer of protection-but
Chigurh informs him it is too late, he is on his own. He offers
Moss a deal: he cannot save himself, but if he hands over the
money, his wife's life will be spared."o
For our purposes, Wells is represented by the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"), which Congress entrusted with primary
enforcement authority over the FDCPA.01 However, in three
International") found that roughly fifty percent of its members made use of this
technology. Id.
98. See NCLC, supra note 38, at 26 (citing changes in telecommunication systems and
computers to expedite collection procedures).
99. For a discussion of these legal perils from the collection agency's point of view, see
generally William P. Hoffman, Comment, Recapturing the Congressional Intent Behind the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 29 ST. LOuIS U. PUB. L. REv. 549, 549-52 (2010).
100. See No COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN, supra note 12. This sort of threat would clearly
violate the FDCPA.
101. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 815, 91 Stat. 874, 882
(1977), repealed by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
2014] 643
644 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92
decades of supervision, the FTC filed only sixty lawsuits against
collectors for violations.10 Moreover, although the agency has
sporadically offered nonbinding advisory opinions on how to
interpret the Act,"1 these have often sent inconsistent messages.'"
For example, FTC staff opinions promoted an unusually narrow
definition of what constitutes "communication" between a collector
and a consumer or third party."os Those FTC staff opinions are
inconsistent with federal case law, which identifies Congress's
intention to use a broad definition of the term "communication."106
Nevertheless, debt collectors rely on the FTC staff opinions' narrow
use of the term-sometimes successfully-to argue that
communications or conduct that would otherwise violate the FDCPA
is exempted from liability.0 7
Meanwhile, consumers have largely been left to fend for
themselves. Although collectors prevail at a high rate of success when
they initiate suits against debtors, 0 experience suggests that most
Americans are largely unaware of the rights and remedies the Act
grants consumers.'" In 2011, the FTC received more than 140,000
consumer complaints about debt collectors, far surpassing complaints
L. No. 111-203, § 1089(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2092 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1692m
(2012)).
102. See FTC, supra note 42, at viii (noting that the FTC increased its emphasis on
enforcement over the last half-decade, bringing more prosecutions against collectors with
the aim of promoting deterrence); see also CFPB, supra note 40, at 14 ("[In 2011], the FTC
... brought or resolved seven debt collection cases, the highest number ... in any single
year.").
103. See NCLC, supra note 38, at 192 ("While the courts are not bound by FTC staff
theories, they sometimes defer to them.").
104. See id. ("The FTC staff commentary appears contradictory.").
105. See id. (analyzing and criticizing the FTC staff opinions). The FDCPA defines
"communication" as "the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly
to any person through any medium." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2012).
106. See, e.g., Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(citation omitted) (explaining how most courts adopt a broad definition of
"communication" to honor both the letter and spirit of the FDCPA).
107. For example, see Part II's analysis of Zortman v. J.C Christensen & Associates,
Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 694 (D. Minn. 2012).
108. See NCLC, supra note 38, at 6. ("Almost all of the millions of collection suits filed
against consumers each year are ineffectively contested and result in default judgments
against the consumer.").
109. See, e.g., CFPB, supra note 40, at 5. ("Based on the FTC's experience, many
consumers never file complaints with anyone other than the debt collector itself. Other
consumers complain only to the underlying creditor or to enforcement agencies other than
the FTC. Some consumers may not be aware that the conduct they have experienced
violates the FDCPA or that the FTC enforces the FDCPA. For these reasons, the total
number of consumer complaints the FTC receives may understate the extent to which the
practices of debt collectors violate the law.").
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about any other industry for the thirteenth year in a row.no Yet the
FTC does not have the resources to investigate (or even review) all
the complaints it receives."' And although consumers often
complained to the FTC about practices that are actually legal under
the FDCPA, evidence suggests the overall number of complaints is
much larger because many consumers mistakenly file complaints with
the wrong federal agency, or else merely with the collectors and
creditors themselves.112
In 2009, the FTC released a workshop report entitled Collecting
Consumer Debts: The Challenges of Change."' The report
summarized the state of disarray into which the Act has fallen,
concluding that "the debt collection legal system needs to be
reformed and modernized to reflect changes in consumer debt, the
debt collection industry, and technology."l 4 The report noted that
widespread abuses by collectors have continued, and it advocated
several practical measures to rein them in, such as increasing the
amount of statutory damages available to plaintiffs whose rights
under the Act are violated."' However, the report's overall tone was
110. Id. at 6. ("The FTC continues to receive more complaints about the debt
collection industry than any other specific industry. Complaints about third-party debt
collectors and in-house collectors in 2011 together totaled 142,743 complaints and
accounted for 27.16% of all complaints the FTC received."); see also NCLC, supra note
38, at 27 (describing the collection industry's unparalleled thirteen-year run of excelling at
generating consumer complaints). The 2011 FTC statistics published in a report by the
Consumer Sentinel Network list "identity theft" as the most frequent subject of consumer
complaints. FED. TRADE COMM'N, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK:
JANUARY - DECEMBER 2011, at 3 (2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/reports annual/sentinel-cy-2011/sentinel-cy2011.pdf. Yet, as the CFPB notes,
"identity theft" is not confined to any single specific industry. CFPB, supra note 40, at 6
n.10. Moreover, several of the other complaint categories significantly overlap with the
collection industry. Id. Apart from debt collection, the industries that prompted the most
complaints in 2011 were "Prizes, Sweepstakes, and Lotteries" (6%), "Shop-at-Home and
Catalog Sales" (5%), "Banks and Lenders" (5%), "Internet Services" (5%), "Auto
Related Complaints" (4%), "Impostor Scams" (4%), "Telephone and Mobile Services"
(4%), "Advance-Fee Loans and Credit Protection/Repair" (3%), and "Foreign Money
Offers and Counterfeit Check Scams" (2%). FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra, at 3.
111. See Halpern, supra note 59, at 65. When Halpern interviewed Reilly Dolan, an
assistant director at the FTC, Dolan argued "such detective work does not fall within [the
FTC's] purview [and] when asked how many complaints were actually read replied that
there was no way to know for certain." Id.
112. See CFPB, supra note 40, at 5.
113. See FTC, supra note 42.
114. Id. at i. As if to hammer home the point, the FTC's 2010 follow-up report was
called Repairing A Broken System: Protecting Consumers in Debt Collection Litigation and
Arbitration, FED. TRADE COMM'N (July 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/07
/debtcollectionreport.pdf.
115. See FTC, supra note 42, at ii.
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surprisingly sympathetic to the collection industry, emphasizing its
importance to the American consumer credit market and generally
treating collectors and their advocates as partners in regulation,
rather than adversaries.116 For example, with regards to new
technologies invented since the Act's passage, the FTC sided with
collectors-who argued they should be allowed to utilize all available
methods of communicating with consumers-over the objections of
consumer advocates concerned about potential invasions of privacy.117
The plot gradually builds towards a climactic showdown that
never occurs. In the end, Moss gets killed, but off-screen, and not
by Chigurh. Instead, the Mexican cartel narrowly beats both its
hired hitman and Sheriff Bell in their race to reach him. Moss
dies in a hail of bullets, and the drug dealers go home with their
money."' In the aftermath, Sheriff Bell visits the darkened
interstate motel room where Moss got gunned down and nearly
comes face to face with Chigurh, who is likewise investigating
how his target slipped away. For a moment, it seems Sheriff Bell
might actually avenge Moss's death by bringing Chigurh to
justice. But the good sheriff knows what he is up against, and
walks away. Maybe he is a coward, or maybe he is a
pragmatist,.9 either way, his abdication has consequences.
Chigurh keeps killing innocent people, including, shortly before
the film ends, and true to his word-Moss's widow.'20
In the absence of consistent guidance from regulators, most
federal district courts have relied on the Act's plain meaning and
legislative history in applying it. Some courts, however, have offered
novel interpretations of various FDCPA provisions. For example, the
Seventh Circuit has long objected to the Act's "least sophisticated
116. Id. Collectors were well represented at these workshops, which is unsurprising
given that collections has evolved into a multi-billion dollar industry. See id. at 35. Leading
collectors advocates include ACA International and the National Association of Retail
Collection Attorneys ("NARCA"). Id. at 14, 40.
117. See id. at 35.
118. When No Country was released, there was some degree of popular dissatisfaction
about the fact that none of what happens in this sentence is ever seen by the audience.
Nonetheless, it is true to the book. It is also pretty well in keeping with how a contingency
contract to collect a debt functions; if the collection agency fails to collect during the
allotted time, the right reverts back to the creditor. See FTC, supra note 42, at 3. Of
course, most creditors stop short of resorting to firearms when this happens.
119. The novel includes a scene omitted from the film that seemingly favors the first of
those two hypotheses. See CORMAC MCCARTHY, No COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN 274-80
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consumer" standard on what might uncharitably be characterized as
grammatical grounds. 121 Instead, the Seventh Circuit has created its
own "unsophisticated consumer" standard, although the court has
also clarified that the two mean essentially the same thing.122 The
Seventh Circuit has also read a "materiality" element into the Act,
which has in some cases exempted collectors from strict liability for
minor violations-such as obvious typographical errors-that would
not deceive or mislead a reasonable unsophisticated consumer.123
Such judicial "innovations" are not necessarily unreasonable, but they
do seemingly conflict with the Act's strict liability standard. And as
such innovations slowly spread to district courts in other circuits, 24
they sometimes produce incongruous outcomes that risk undermining
the Act's explicit goal of protecting consumers. 25 In a related
development, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Marx v. General
Revenue Corporationl26 broke new ground with its unprecedented
holding that a successful debt collector should be entitled to have a
consumer-plaintiff pay the collector's legal fees without having to
121. See, e.g., Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 27 F.3d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1994)
("Literally, the least sophisticated consumer is not merely 'below average,' he is the very
last rung on the sophistication ladder. Stated another way, he is the single most
unsophisticated consumer who exists. Even assuming that he would be willing to do so,
such a consumer would not likely be able to read a collection notice with care (or at all),
let alone interpret it in a reasonable fashion. Courts which use the 'least sophisticated
consumer' test, however, routinely blend in the element of reasonableness.").
122. See Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 227 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Gammon does not
significantly change the substance of the 'least sophisticated consumer' standard as it had
been routinely applied by the courts.").
123. See, e.g., Hahn v. Triumph P'ships, 557 F.3d 755, 758 (7th Cir. 2009).
124. See, e.g., Stewart v. Bierman, 859 F. Supp. 2d 754, 762-63 (D. Md. 2012)
(describing how the materiality element has spread from the Seventh Circuit to the Sixth,
Ninth, and now the Fourth Circuits as well). The Fourth Circuit has justified its adoption
of the materiality requirement by noting "[a]lthough Congress did not expressly require
that any violation of § 1692e be material, courts have generally held that violations
grounded in 'false representations' must rest on material representations." Warren v.
Sessoms & Rogers, 676 F.3d 365, 374 (4th Cir. 2012). However, as the Bierman court
acknowledged, the materiality analysis is not always straightforward in application
because it does not apply to all FDCPA provisions relating to false representations. See
Bierman, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 763 (quoting Warren, 676 F.3d at 374). For example, in
Warren, the Fourth Circuit court reversed the district court's erroneous application of the
materiality standard to the plaintiffs section 1692e(11) failure to disclose claim when a
collector did not disclose "that the communication ... was from a debt collector." Warren,
676 F.3d at 374 (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. See Bierman, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 764 (dismissing plaintiffs' FDCPA claim against a
law firm for lack of materiality despite the fact it engaged in "robo-signings" to forge
notary signatures and seals when foreclosing on plaintiffs' homes, essentially because the
foreclosures would have happened eventually regardless of the fraudulent robo-signings at
issue).
126. 668 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2011).
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demonstrate the complaint was brought in bad faith, which the Act
explicitly requires. 127
Meanwhile, debt collectors continue to make headlines with
innovative and abusive strategies. In Minnesota, collectors stalked
emergency room waiting areas, demanding sick and injured patients
pay before receiving treatment. 12 8 And in Missouri, collection lawyers
briefly resurrected English-style debtors' prisons by using civil
attachments to have consumers who do not pay judgments against
them thrown in jail.'29
While these outrageous actions would almost certainly violate
the FDCPA and other laws, it must be acknowledged that most debt
collectors are clearly not as evil as a homicidal maniac like Anton
Chigurh, or even his real-life counterparts who stalk their prey in
hospitals.'30 The fact that No Country for Old Men provides a
convenient narrative metaphor for explaining the current state of
affairs ought not be taken as direct personal condemnation of the
127. Id. at 1178-79. The text of 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) reads:
[I]n the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of
the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court.
On a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in bad faith
and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant
attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs.
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) (2012) (emphasis added). However, despite the seemingly clear
statutory language, the Supreme Court of the United States ultimately upheld the district
court's award of attorney fees. See Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1170-71
(2013). Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas contended,
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 91 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692k(a)(3), provides that "[o]n a finding by the court that an action under this
section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may
award to the defendant attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the work
expended and costs." This case presents the question whether § 1692k(a)(3)
"provides otherwise" than Rule 54(d)(1). We conclude that § 1692k(a)(3) does not
"provid[e] otherwise," and thus a district court may award costs to prevailing
defendants in FDCPA cases without finding that the plaintiff brought the case in
bad faith and for the purpose of harassment.
Id.
128. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Medical Debt Collector to Settle Suit for $2.5 Million,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2012, at B1-B2.
129. Jim Gallagher, Payday Lenders Use Courts to Create Modern Debtor's Prison, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 19, 2012, 12:15 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local
/payday-lenders-use-courts-to-create-modern-debtors-prison/articlef56ca6aa-e880-1lel-
b154-0019bb30f31a.html ("[J]udges often set the debtor's release bond at the amount of
the debt and turn the bond money over to the creditor - essentially turning publicly
financed police and court employees into private debt collectors for predatory lenders.").
130. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 128 (describing debt collection in emergency
rooms).
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collection industry's thousands of employees, most of whom are no
doubt honest and hardworking as they toil through the thankless-
but (from a macro-economic perspective) vital-tasks before them.
Indeed, for many-including the plaintiff in the lead case discussed
below in Part II-being employed by a debt collector is the main
thing that separates them from being called by one.'3 1
That, of course, brings up one last thing No Country for Old
Men can remind us about the collection industry and its targets.
Part of what makes what is perhaps the film's most iconic scene
so remarkable is the fact that Anton Chigurh does not kill
someone. Instead, he offers the proprietor of a rural gas station
the chance to keep his life by correctly calling the outcome of a
coin flip, heads or tails. The old man behind the cash register
inherited the store from his father-in-law and is guilty of nothing
more than slightly delaying Chigurh in his quest by virtue of
having attempted to engage him in polite small-talk. He is first
confused, then terrified, when the hitman delivers an ominous
soliloquy about coins and destiny and how everything inevitably
ends. After the old man asks what is at stake, Chigurh answers
"everything." The old man objects that he has no recollection of
wagering anything. Chigurh insists the old man has been putting
it up his whole life and did not even know. Then Chigurh flips
the quarter and the old man guesses right.13 2
In a way, most of us are never very much further removed than a
couple of bad decisions or a long-term illness or injury or economic
recession away from a brush with Anton Chigurh, buried like Josh
Horton beneath an avalanche of unpleasant telephone
conversations.' If the American Dream is a gamble, then whatever
our noble intentions or diligent preparations, to a certain extent the
hand that tosses the coin is influenced by events beyond our
individual control. Some bets just don't pay off, although like the old
man, those folks lucky enough to marry or be born into financial
privilege often stand a better chance than the rest. The law may aim
to shield us, but like Sheriff Bell, the FDCPA has grown long in the
tooth.134
131. See NCLC, supra note 38, at 7 (describing the low pay collectors typically receive);
Halpern, supra note 59, at 67 (describing same).
132. See NO COuNTRY FOR OLD MEN, supra note 12.
133. See Horton Interview, supra note 13.
134. In the film's final scene, we see Sheriff Bell sitting at his breakfast table, retired,
full of regret. He describes the dreams he had the night before. They are about his father,
and borrowing money, and the way they carried fire in the olden days. These dreams are
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II. THE VOICEMAIL PARADOX
A. Origins of the Voicemail Paradox
In February 2012, U.S. Representative Barney Frank introduced
H.R. 4101.15 If passed, the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Clarification Act of 2012 would have amended the FDCPA to allow
debt collectors to
leave messages for a consumer in connection with the collection
of a debt on the consumer's answering machine, voice
messaging system, or other similar device, including in an initial
communication with the consumer, so long as the message
complies with regulations prescribed by the [Consumer
Financial Protection] Bureau to ensure the preservation of the
privacy and other rights granted to the consumer, including the
restrictions on communications with third parties ... ."6
Frank's bill was designed to cure what debt collectors have come
to call the Voicemail Paradox."' They contend that voicemails are a
cheap, efficient, and vital means of contacting consumers.' 8 Since
2006, debt collectors have found it increasingly difficult to leave a
message after the proverbial "beep" without incurring liability for
violating the FDCPA.13 9 Over the last half-decade, collectors and
their advocates have repeatedly called on Congress to amend the Act
to exempt them from what they view as an undeserved deluge of
frivolous suits based on hyper-technical infractions brought by
debtors confused by unscrupulous consumer advocate lawyers.'4
enigmatic, but it would not be wholly implausible to hear in Sheriff Bell's monologue a
profound statement about the very progress and perpetuation of the human species, and
how the light that guides us is the law, which is a precious but fragile tool, waning but
worthy of preservation, not only for ourselves but the generations to follow us. Judging
from his tone and the glint in his eyes, it is difficult not to conclude that the good sheriff
thinks himself a failure in this grander enterprise. But then, who are we to judge Tommy
Lee Jones? See No COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN, supra note 12.
135. Fair Debt Collection Practices Clarification Act of 2012, H.R. 4101, 112th Cong.
(2012).
136. Id. The bill was later amended in May 2012, by H.R. 5794, which was substantially
the same with the addition of a disclaimer stating: "Nothing in the previous sentence shall
be construed as providing an exemption from liability based on any rule, regulation,
interpretation, advisory opinion, or approval made by any entity other than the Bureau or
an official or employee of the Bureau." Fair Debt Collection Practices Clarification Act of
2012, H.R. 5794, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012).
137. See H.R. 5794.
138. See FTC, supra note 42, at 47-49.
139. Id. at 47.
140. See Hoffman, supra note 99, at 556. As is inevitably the case when a well-funded
industry objects to being sued, most of the trouble is blamed on avaricious lawyers, who
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They argue that restrictions on their ability to leave voicemails are
unsupported by the Act itself and therefore contradict Congressional
intent, violate the First Amendment as unreasonable restrictions on
commercial free speech, and harm consumers by denying them the
opportunity to negotiate settlements. 141
Unfortunately for debt collectors, Representative Frank's bill
eventually died in committee. 142 As it stands today, in the vast
majority of federal district courts, a debt collector who leaves a
voicemail on a consumer's answering machine will be liable for
violating the FDCPA if he does not properly identify himself.143
However, even if his voicemail does comply with FDCPA's mini-
Miranda requirement, if his message is overheard by the consumer's
neighbor, roommate, child, co-worker, or employer, the debt
collector will be held liable for violating the Act's prohibition against
communicating about a debt with an unauthorized third party. 144
This Section begins with a tour of the FDCPA provisions that
combine to create the Voicemail Paradox. Part II.A.1 illustrates that
while voicemails were not widely used at the time of the Act's passage
in 1977, when taken together, subsections 1692c(b), 1692d(6),
1692e(11) were always intended to protect consumers against similar
harms. Next, in Part II.A.2, the focus shifts to an analysis of the
landmark holding in Foti v. NCO Financial Systems,145 which held a
collector liable for violating the Voicemail Paradox and sparked a
"exploit the vagueness of the FDCPA" and its strict liability standard to tempt debtors
into filing frivolous lawsuits with disingenuous promises their debts will disappear, thus
resulting in "an onslaught of litigation ... pitting the unwitting consumer against the often
fair and honest collector. In the end, the losers are creditors, consumers, and the taxpayers
who support our courts, suffering at the expense of consumer advocacy attorneys." Id. at
550-51.
141. See, e.g., Patrick Lunsford, Another Circuit Court Ruling Complicates Answering
Machine Use in Debt Collection, INSIDEARM.COM (Oct. 20, 2009), http://www.insidearm
.com/daily/debt-collection-news/debt-collection/another-circuit-court-ruling-complicates-
answering-machine-use-in-debt-collection/print/ (quoting a collection lawyer arguing that
"Congress never intended to prevent communicating with consumers by telephone"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
142. See H.R. 5794 (112th): Fair Debt Collection Practices Clarification Act of 2012,
GOVTRACK.us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr5794 (last visited Jan. 3,
2014). While the exact reasons for the bill's demise are murky, one plausible explanation
might be since Dodd-Frank's passage, Congressional Republicans have been far less
concerned with amending individual provisions of consumer protection laws than with
neutering or abolishing the CFPB altogether. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Friends of Fraud,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/opinion/krugman-friends-
of-fraud.html?ref=consumerfinancialprotectionbureau.
143. See infra Part II.A.3.
144. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (2012).
145. 424 F. Supp. 2d 643,659 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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wave of related litigation in federal district courts across the country.
An examination of the post-Foti cases in Part II.A.3 demonstrates not
only Foti's widespread influence but also the persistence some debt
collectors have shown in searching for a loophole to avoid liability.
The remainder of Part II focuses on Zortman v. J.C. Christensen &
Associates,46 a case that potentially provides collectors with a script
for leaving messages after the proverbial "beep" without triggering
the Paradox. After Section B explains the facts and holding of
Zortman, Section C argues the court's holding was based on flawed
reasoning, which Section D contends could threaten to undermine
consumer privacy interests.
1. FDCPA Provisions
The FDCPA's Voicemail Paradox is not actually a paradox.147
Debt collectors frequently describe it as an untenable Hobson's
choice, but courts have roundly rejected that characterization,
pointing out the dilemma is self-imposed." Nonetheless, the
Voicemail Paradox does exemplify how unanticipated shifts in
communication technologies and collection industry practices-
combined with a lack of timely reforms-have left the FDCPA in a
state of disarray. If the Act is best understood as a product of its
146. 870 F. Supp. 2d 694 (D. Minn. 2012).
147. See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1636 (3d ed. 1993). The
term implies an inherent, inescapable logical contradiction. While it is true most courts
have held collectors cannot comply with either section 1692c(b) or the FDCPA's mini-
Miranda provision without violating the other, there is no legal requirement collectors
must leave voicemails, nor is voicemail the only practical means of communicating with a
consumer in an effort to collect a debt. See Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 659.
148. Some courts have taken collectors to task over the dire terms they (mis)apply to
describe their (entirely avoidable) plight. See, e.g., Mark v. J.C. Christensen & Assocs.,
Inc., No. 09-100, 2009 WL 2407700, at *4 n.2 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2009) (describing why this
is not a Hobson's choice). As the Mark court notes,
The predicament JCC claims the FDCPA creates is not technically a "Hobson's
choice." A "Hobson's choice" describes a situation presenting an individual with
"the option of taking the one thing offered or nothing." ... JCC's claimed
predicament is more aptly described as a "Morton's Fork." Named after John
Morton-the Archbishop of Canterbury and minister of Henry VII, who
supposedly employed a "method of levying forced loans by arguing that those who
were obviously rich could afford to pay, and those who lived frugally must have
amassed savings"-the term refers to "a practical dilemma, esp. one in which both
the choices or alternatives available disadvantage or discredit the chooser." A
much more familiar, baby-boomeresque description for the claimed dilemma
would be a "Catch 22," which refers to a "law or regulation containing provisions
which are mutually frustrating." The term, of course, derives its name from Joseph
Heller's 1961 novel, Catch-22.
Id. (citations omitted).
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times, then the so-called "Voicemail Paradox" illustrates how
dramatically times have changed over the last three and a half
decades. With scant guidance from federal regulatory agencies,
district courts have been forced to step into the void and determine
how best to reinterpret outdated legislation to fit contemporary
contexts.14 9 Although courts have generally honored the FDCPA's
mission of protecting consumers and their privacy, the patchwork
nature of the federal judiciary has enabled incongruous results in
several jurisdictions,"so which highlights the need for the CFPB to
assert its authority and update the Act.
The FDCPA never actually mentions voicemails, which is
unsurprising given that although answering machines had already
been invented by 1977, they were not widely used in American homes
and businesses until the late 1980s."' Instead, the Act focused on
regulating collectors' use (and abuse) of then-dominant
technologies-such as telephones, telegrams, and the mail-to
communicate with consumers. 5 2 Nonetheless, the roots of the
Voicemail Paradox were planted at the Act's inception in separate
provisions.
On the one hand, the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from
communicating with any unauthorized third parties "in connection
with the collection of any debt." 53 While the Act provides a narrow
149. See, e.g., Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 657 (contemplating various constructions of the
term "communication").
150. See, e.g., Zortman, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 699 (explaining federal district courts'
difficulty interpreting the FDCPA due to "practical concerns and technological
developments"); see also supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (describing judicial
improvisations, such as the materiality requirement).
151. See Zortman, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 698 ("The FDCPA has not been significantly
amended since its enactment in 1977. Technology, however, has changed significantly
since then. In particular, voicemail was not available until 1977. Consumers might have
had answering machines, but those machines would not have been as widely used as
voicemail today.").
152. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5) (2012) (barring "[c]ausing a telephone to ring or
engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to
annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number"); id. § 1692f(7)-(8) (prohibiting
communication via postcards and "[u]sing any language or symbol, other than the debt
collector's address, on any envelope when communicating with a consumer by use of the
mails or by telegram").
153. See id. § 1692c(b) ("Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the
prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express
permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a
postjudgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with
the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a
consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the
creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector." (emphasis added)).
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range of exceptions to this rule to allow collectors to contact third
parties to obtain location information about an alleged debtor, even
in those cases collectors may not reveal that the consumer owes a
debt, and may not even identify themselves as collectors unless
specifically asked. 15 4 This statute reflects congressional intent to
protect consumers' privacy by barring the "noxious practice" 5 5
collectors frequently employed before the FDCPA's passage of
"disclosing a consumer's personal affairs to friends, neighbors, or an
employer."'5 6 Prohibiting unauthorized third-party communications
limits collectors' ability to shame or intimidate a consumer by
revealing (or threatening to reveal) embarrassing financial
information that could potentially contribute to "marital instability,
to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy."' In 2011,
17.5% of all FDCPA complaints related to third-party
communications, and 10.8% of all complaints specifically involved the
unauthorized disclosure of the existence of a debt.58
On the other hand, two FDCPA provisions mandate that debt
collectors must properly identify themselves in all communications
with a consumer. First, under section 1692e(11), if a debt collector
fails to disclose in any communication with a consumer that he is
"attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will
be used for that purpose,"' 59 he violates the Act's prohibition on
utilizing "false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s] or means in
connection with the collection of any debt.""s This subsection of the
statute is commonly referred to as the Act's "mini-Miranda"
requirement, and it was modeled after a series of pre-FDCPA
consent decrees designed by the FTC to prevent collectors from
tricking consumers into unknowingly revealing private and financial
information that could make it easier to collect the debt or to harass
or deceive the debtor. 6' Generally, compliance with mini-Miranda
154. See id. § 1692b.
155. Zortrnan, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 701.
156. S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696.
157. 15 U.S.C. § 1692; see S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695,1696.
158. CFPB, supra note 40, at 9.
159. § 1692e(11).
160. Id. § 1692e.
161. See NCLC, supra note 38, at 291. These disclosure requirements partially arose as
a response to combat a common scam by which collectors sent fake sweepstake entries to
debtors, offering fictitious prizes to induce the debtor to unwittingly reveal his address,
phone number, and financial information. Id. For a more recent example, see Romine v.
Diversified Collection Servs. Inc., 155 F.3d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998), in which collectors
hired Western Union to mail debtors notification they had received a "personal telegram,"
654 [Vol. 92
NO COUNTRY FOR VOICEMAILS
requires the collector to give either his name or the name of his
employer and also to state that the communication is being made in
an attempt to collect a debt explicitly. 62 Although the mini-Miranda
requirement fits into the Act's broader anti-fraud goals by prohibiting
false or misleading representations, this Comment will argue that
given the FDCPA's stated purpose and subsequent judicial
interpretations of the rule, it also embodies important, if sometimes
overlooked, privacy considerations. Moreover, under section 1692d, if
a debt collector "placels] ... telephone calls without meaningful
disclosure of [his] identity,"s16 he violates the Act's ban against
"engag[ing] in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to
harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection
of a debt."'" While this latter provision addresses conduct rather than
communication, its function overlaps significantly with the mini-
Miranda requirement; generally speaking, violating one is typically
sufficient to violate the other, and most complaints usually allege
breaches of both. In 2011, 17.7% of all FDCPA complaints listed
violations of one or both.'6 s
The Act specifies that mini-Miranda applies to both oral and
written communications, and its interplay with the bar against
unauthorized third-party disclosures is clearly contemplated. For
example, the Act prohibits communicating with consumers via
postcards and also bans them from sending telegrams or mailing
letters that identify their senders as debt collectors on the outside of
the envelope.'" Of course, since the FDCPA's passage in 1977,
postcards and telegrams have largely been relegated to the proverbial
"ash heap of history."167 As answering machines proliferated over the
1980s and 1990s, collectors naturally sought to exploit this convenient
new means of communicating with debtors. Yet from the outset, there
was widespread recognition by collectors of the potential for liability
along with instructions to call Western Union and confirm their personal information to
insure accurate delivery. Id. When debtors complied, Western Union recorded their
telephone numbers, then sold them to the collectors, who utilized them to contact the
debtors directly. Id.
162. Mini-Miranda does not require collectors to describe the debt further. See § 1692e.
The Act does not prescribe specific language collectors must use, but saying some
variation of the words "this is an attempt to collect to debt" suffices to comply.
163. § 1692d(6)
164. Id. § 1692d.
165. CFPB, supra note 40, at 9.
166. § 1692f(7)-(8).
167. See Mark Liberman, The What of History?, LANGUAGE LOG (Dec. 23, 2011, 4:21
AM), http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edulnil/?p=3654 (discussing the origins of this oft-
repeated turn of phrase).
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created by the combination of the Act's bar on third-party disclosures
and mini-Miranda requirement as applied in the context of
voicemails.16 1 For the most part, collectors ignored the latter in order
to avoid running afoul of the former. 169
2. Foti
This strategy worked until roughly 2006, when the Southern
District of New York issued its landmark holding in Foti v. NCO
Financial Systems, Inc.,170 which laid the foundations for what would
come to be called the Voicemail Paradox.17 ' The plaintiffs in Foti
received pre-recorded messages on their answering machines urging
them to call a toll-free phone number regarding "a personal business
matter that requires your immediate attention."172 Although the
voicemails specifically identified NCO as their source, they made no
reference to the fact that NCO is a collection agency or that the
messages were left by a debt collector seeking to collect a debt.173
Those who called the toll-free number provided were unexpectedly
connected to NCO collectors, who aggressively confronted them
about the debts they allegedly owed and demanded immediate
payment in full.174 When the plaintiffs sued claiming these voicemails
168. See, e.g., Zortman v. J.C. Christensen & Assocs., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 694, 699 (D.
Minn. 2012) ("For many years, debt collectors refrained from identifying themselves on
voicemail messages. This was, as counsel for JCC explains it and as is evident from
litigation around the country, out of concern for running afoul of § 1692c(b).").
169. See id. "After all, once a message is left, the person who left the message has no
control over who might listen to the message. Messages that contained information about
a named consumer's debt could be heard by individuals other than the intended
consumer," which would violate section 1692c(b). Id.
170. 424 F. Supp. 2d 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
171. Foti was not the first Paradox case; in 2005, the Central District of California
found a similar violation in Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Associates, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104
(C.D. Cal. 2005). Nonetheless, most courts and critics have subsequently identified Foti as
the point where the trend actually took off.
172. Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 648.
173. Id. In its entirety, the message ran as follows: "Good day, we are calling from
NCO Financial Systems regarding a personal business matter that requires your
immediate attention. Please call back 1-866-701-1275 once again please call back, toll-free,
1-866-701-1275, this is not a solicitation." Id.
174. Id. In addition to violating mini-Miranda, the plaintiffs further alleged these
return calls violated section 1692g's requirement that collectors provide consumers with
information about the process for disputing the validity of a debt. Id. at 649-50. The
FDCPA allows a thirty-day window, starting at the first communication, in which a
consumer can dispute the debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (2012). If she does, the collector is
prohibited from further communication with her until validity is confirmed. Id. In Foti,
NCO had provided written notice about these procedures roughly two and one-half weeks
before leaving the voicemails. Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 647-48. However, plaintiffs argued
these procedures were intentionally and illegally "overshadowed" by both the pre-
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violated the FDCPA's mini-Miranda requirement, NCO responded
by arguing that the message was not a "communication" as defined by
the Act "because it [did] not convey any information regarding a
debt, but instead simply request[ed] a return call regarding an
important business matter.""'
The court was unconvinced by NCO's (novel and self-servingly)
narrow interpretation of what "communication" means.176 After
noting that the FDCPA's statutory definition of the term
encompasses "the conveying of information regarding a debt directly
or indirectly to any person through any medium"177 and outlining the
general tendency across all federal circuits towards construing the Act
liberally in favor of consumers, the Foti court ultimately rejected
NCO's contention that the voicemail was not a "communication"
because it never explicitly mentioned any debt.17 1 Instead, reasoning
that "the obvious purpose of the message was to provide the debtor
with enough information to entice a return call"-which, as indicated
by the transcripts introduced at trial, clearly revolved around the
underlying debt and its collection-the Foti court concluded "it is
difficult to imagine how [this] voicemail message is not a
communication under the FDCPA."179 To hold otherwise, it noted,
would create a gaping loophole in the Act that would be "inconsistent
with Congress's intent to protect consumers from 'serious and
widespread' debt collection abuses."so
The court was similarly unsympathetic towards NCO's fallback
argument that, given the FDCPA's bar against unauthorized third-
party communications, forcing collectors to identify themselves in
voicemails presents them with an untenable Hobson's choice, forcing
them to violate one provision of the Act in order to comply with
recorded messages and the return calls they encouraged. Id. at 650. The transcript of a
representative return call reveals that the collector made no reference to the still
unexpired thirty-day dispute window and instead demanded immediate payment in full.
Id. at 648-49.
175. Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 654.
176. Id. at 654-55. As the court noted, NCO could not find a single case to cite in its
brief as authority in support of its definition. Id. at 654.
177. Id. at 654 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2)).
178. Id. at 669. Although the court allowed that properly identifying itself in the
message as "NCO Financial Services" might plausibly be sufficient to alert some
consumers they had received a call from a collection agency regarding a debt, the message
still violated section 1692e(11) in light of the FDCPA's least sophisticated consumer
standard. Id.
179. Id. at 656.
180. Id. at 657-58.
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another.'s As the court noted, "NCO's argument is essentially based
on the assumption that it is somehow entitled to leave pre-recorded
messages."18 However, while the FDCPA explicitly authorizes
telephone communications and does not specifically ban voicemails,
the court emphasized that the Act "does not entitle the collector to
use any means, even if those means are the most economical or
efficient."' Thus, after acknowledging that there is indeed a conflict
in complying with both section 1692e(11) and section 1692c(b), the
court concluded
the fact that NCO may not be able to leave a pre-recorded
message that complies with both [provisions] in no way
warrants a conclusion that "communication" should be
narrowly interpreted. Rather, it merely suggests that a debt
collector is not permitted to leave a pre-recorded message in
violation of the FDCPA.18
Moreover, because collectors still have numerous other methods for
effectively and legally communicating with debtors,' the Foti court
held this supposed Hobson's choice was actually just a self-imposed
(and easily averted) dilemma, created by NCO's own actions.186
3. Post-Foti Litigation Trends
Although the court stopped short of declaring a categorical
prohibition on collector voicemails, its holding sparked a new wave of
related FDCPA suits and heavily influenced their outcomes. Citing
Foti as persuasive authority, most courts have held debt collectors
liable for violating the Act if they leave voicemails that do not comply
181. Id. at 658. Citing this dilemma as further reason to hold the voicemail did not fit
the Act's statutory definition of communication, NCO contended, "The safest thing to do
is to recognize what it is. It is not a communication. Once you recognize that it is not a
communication, then there is no obligation to identify that you are a debt collector." Id.
(quotation omitted). The court rejected NCO's argument, but it remains interesting
insofar as it illustrates perhaps the most paradoxical aspect of the Voicemail Paradox-
that is, debt collectors believe voicemails are both a convenient way to communicate with
consumers but are also simultaneously not "communication" as defined by the Act. See id.
at 659.
182. Id. at 659.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. ("Debt collectors, however, could continue to use other means to collect,
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with the Act's mini-Miranda requirement.'" Furthermore, following
Foti's logic, collectors who actually do identify themselves in
voicemails have usually been held liable for violating section 1692c(b)
when those messages are overheard by third parties.' 8
Unsurprisingly, this trend has proven extremely unpopular
amongst debt collectors, who have argued "the ability to leave
messages for consumers [via voicemail] is essential in seeking
payment on delinquent debts"' and that prohibiting them from
leaving voicemails will not only increase their own costs, but also the
cost of credit to all consumers." Some have offered dire warnings
and slippery slope arguments that the Voicemail Paradox will
eventually outlaw all telephone contact'9' and thus risks eliminating
"all communications with debtors with the exception of lawsuits."l 92
When sued, collectors sometimes cite a handful of FTC advisory
opinions from the 1980s supporting a narrower definition of
"communication,"1 93 as well as the text of the Act itself, which
187. See, e.g., Mark v. J.C. Christensen & Assocs., Inc., No. 09-100, 2009 WL 2407700,
at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2009); Edwards v. Niagara Credit Solutions, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d
1346, 1359 (N.D. Ga. 2008); Costa v. Nat'l Action Fin. Servs., 634 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1075
(E.D. Cal. 2007).
188. See Branco v. Credit Collection Servs. Inc., No. S-10-1242, 2011 WL 3684503, at
*4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011); Valentine v. Brock & Scott, PLLC, No. 09-CV-2555, 2010
WL 1727681, at *4 (D.S.C. Apr. 26, 2010); Leahey v. Franklin Collection Serv., Inc., 756 F.
Supp. 2d 1322, 1327 (N.D. Ala. 2010); Berg v. Merch. Ass'n Collection Div., 586 F. Supp.
2d 1336,1340 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
189. FTC, supra note 42, at 47 (citation omitted).
190. Id. at 35.
191. A typical iteration of this type of "slippery slope" logic is illustrated by the debt
collector's argument in Mark, 2009 WL 2407700, at *6. As the court summarized,
If debt collectors leave messages that include the [mini-Miranda] disclosures, they
might violate the third-party disclosure prohibition; if they leave messages without
the disclosures, they violate the requirement on giving such disclosures; and if they
leave no message, opting instead to call back later in the hope of reaching a live
person, they run the risk of violating the prohibition on repeated calling in 15
U.S.C. 1692d(5). Thus ... a debt collector's only safe practice is simply not to use
telephone messaging at all.
Id.
192. See Lunsford, supra note 141.
193. See, e.g., Zortman v. J.C. Christensen & Assocs., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 694, 698 (D.
Minn. 2012) (citing 53 Fed. Reg. 50097-02 (Dec. 13, 1988)). As noted in Part I, the FTC
often sent mixed messages to collectors, whom it often seemed to view less as targets for
regulation than as partners. Further evidence of this viewpoint can be seen in an FTC
report, where the agency more or less agreed with collectors that (despite the Paradox)
they should generally be permitted to contact consumers using whatever new technologies
those consumers adopt. See FTC, supra note 42, at 36 ("To provide more certainty to the
industry and to protect consumers from harm, the Commission concludes that debt
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expressly allows them to utilize telephones. 94 Moreover, collectors
claim courts have misconstrued the Act, asserting neither mini-
Miranda nor the bar against third-party communications were
intended to penalize innocent mistakes that do not actually harm
consumers. 9 In short, they allege Congress never intended they
should suffer such an untenable dilemma.196
Generally, these arguments have garnered little sympathy from
the courts. Thus far, the highest authority on the Voicemail Paradox
comes from the Eleventh Circuit, which openly mocked the
collector's description of the Hobson's Choice it allegedly faced by
noting,
In an oft-repeated statement from the Vietnam War, an
unidentified American military officer reputedly said that "we
had to destroy the village to save it." That oxymoronic
explanation may be apocryphal, but the debt collection agency
in this case offers up much the same logic to explain why it
violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: it was
necessary to violate the Act in order to comply with the Act."
Following Foti, most courts have agreed that nothing in the FDCPA
guarantees or entitles debt collectors the right to leave voicemails 98
and that collectors who choose to leave them do so at their own
peril.19 9 Courts have also rejected arguments that the Paradox violates
collection law needs to be modernized to take account of today's new communication
technologies.").
194. See, e.g., Mark, 2009 WL 2407700, at *2.
195. See, e.g., Lunsford, supra note 141 (quoting a collection lawyer arguing "[w]hen
consumers use answering machines, they are inviting the unknown public to leave them
messages ... [i]t does not hurt consumers for collectors to leave respectful messages ...
that's [not] something Congress ever contemplated").
196. To combat this state of affairs, collectors have proposed solutions implicating both
prongs of the so-called "Paradox." ACA International, for example, has recommended
amending the FDCPA to absolve collectors from liability for voicemails that accidentally
disclose the existence of a debt to third parties. FTC, supra note 42, at 48. On the other
hand, NARCA advocates propose weakening the applicability of the mini-Miranda rule
by allowing collectors "to leave voicemail messages that request a return call but do not
reveal the collector's identity or the nature of the call." Id.
197. Edwards v. Niagara Credit Solutions, Inc., 584 F.3d 1350, 1351 (11th Cir. 2009)
(rejecting the collector's argument and imposing liability for violating the FDCPA).
198. Id. at 1354 ("[I]f [the debt collector's] assumption is correct, the answer is that the
[FDCPA] does not guarantee a debt collector the right to leave answering machine
messages."); see also Koby v. ARS Nat'l Servs., Inc., No. 09CV0780, 2010 WL 1438763, at
*4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2010) ("Nothing in the FDCPA or the Constitution entitles or
guarantees a debt collector the right to leave a message on a debtor's voice mail.").
199. See, e.g., Berg v. Merch. Ass'n Collection Div., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1341 (S.D.
Fla. 2008); see also Sclafani v. BC Servs., Inc., No. 10-61360-CIV, 2010 WL 4116471, at *3
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2010) (rejecting defendant collector's arguments in favor of the
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the First Amendment-and that the FDCPA therefore
unconstitutionally restricts commercial speech-by applying the four-
pronged test laid out in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v.
Public Service Commission of New York20 to uphold the challenged
provisions because they (1) address unlawful or misleading
commercial speech, and (2) serve a substantial government interest
that they (3) directly advance (4) in a manner no more extensive than
necessary.201
While some collectors have abandoned leaving voicemails until
reforms are enacted, others have sought to craft solutions of their
own by refining the scripts of the messages they leave after the beep.
So far, these endeavors have proven fruitless, as exemplified in Berg
v. Merchants Ass'n Collection Division, Inc.2' There, the debt
collector left a voicemail identifying the consumer by name and then
provided a warning to anyone else who might be listening to
disconnect the answering machine; after a brief pause, the message
complied with mini-Miranda by identifying the collection agency and
admitting the call was placed in connection with a debt.203 The
plaintiff sued for a violation of section 1692c(b) after his neighbor and
relatives overheard the message.20 The court held the collector liable,
reasoning that while the introductory disclaimer might alert third
parties they should stop listening to avoid overhearing potentially
private information, it did not give the consumer sufficient warning to
disconnect if listening while others were present.205 While
acknowledging that Foti left open the possibility that collectors could
Eleventh Circuit's reasoning discussed in Edwards); Leahey v. Franklin Collection Serv.,
Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1327 (N.D. Ala. 2010) (holding that a pause before complying
with the disclosure requirements was nevertheless a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b)).
200. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
201. Id. at 566; see also Koby, 2010 WL 1438763, at *6 (holding the FDCPA provisions
at issue do not violate the Central Hudson test); Mark v. J.C. Christensen & Assocs., Inc.,
No. 09-100, 2009 WL 2407700, at *7-8 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2009) (same).
202. 586 F. Supp. 2d 1336,1339 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
203. Id. The full text of the Berg message is as follows:
Hello. This message is for Thomas Berg. If you are not the person requested,
disconnect this recording now. By continuing to listen to this recording you
acknowledge you are the person requested. This is MAF Collection Services. We
are expecting your call at 1-800-749-7710. This is an attempt to collect a debt. Any
information obtained will be used for that purpose. 1-800-749-7710.
Id. (quotation omitted).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1343. Indeed, given human nature and the unquenchable thirst for gossip,
one wonders if the message might have the unintended effect of actually encouraging
unauthorized third parties to keep listening.
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potentially leave voicemails that do not violate the FDCPA, the Berg
court emphasized that by choosing to leave voicemails, collectors
essentially assume the risk of utilizing "an inherently risky method of
communication." 20 6 Since it is not clear what language courts will
accept, collectors have continued to search for the perfect script by
which to leave a message after the beep.
B. Zortman and the Search for the Perfect Script
As noted above, trends in communication technology have
shifted dramatically in recent years. Just as the original FDCPA did
not anticipate the rise of answering machines and voicemails, Foti and
its progeny focused on messages left via traditional landline
telephones. Since Foti, however, consumers have increasingly
abandoned landlines in favor of cellphones; 207 ironically then, a line of
cases based on the notion that contemporary technology has rendered
parts of the FDCPA obsolete may itself risk obsolescence.
Collectors recognize this trend and have argued that in a world
where cell phones, text messages, e-mails, and social media have
eclipsed the means of communication originally envisioned under the
FDCPA, in order "to maximize their chances of successfully reaching
consumers"208-especially younger consumers-they must be allowed
to contact them via whatever primary contact method they choose to
adopt.209 However, consumer advocates have warned that allowing
collectors to utilize social media to communicate with debtors
increases the risk of abuse, harassment, and privacy invasions.21 0 Both
sides view the Voicemail Paradox as an important battle in this longer
war.
Collectors recently won what may prove an important
breakthrough in a 2012 case decided by Minnesota's federal district
206. Id.
207. See FTC, supra note 42, at vi, 39.
208. Id. at 39.
209. See id. at 35-39.
210. See, e.g., Colin Hector, Note, Debt Collection in the Information Age: New
Technologies and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1601, 1619
(2011). Hector offers an insightful account of the Voicemail Paradox's evolution since Foti
and argues that the broad construction of "communication" the vast majority of courts
have adopted since should be used as a model/standard for applying the FDCPA to social
media and new communications technologies in the future. Id. at 1612-17. Hector has a
strong point: following the logic of Foti and its progeny would fulfill the Act's mission of
protecting consumers. Id. at 1615. Unfortunately, however, debt collectors have not yet
conceded the issue, and indeed that may well be a key victory in Zortman. See infra notes
211-19 and accompanying text.
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court. Zortman v. J.C. Christensen & Associates, Inc."' provides an
interesting case study of collectors' strategies for finding a loophole
that might allow for an end-run around Foti and its progeny.212
Indeed, the Zortman court's holding-which, based on a narrow view
of "communication," found no liability for what seemed like a clear-
cut section 1692c(b) violation under the vast majority of Paradox
cases-could potentially function as the perfect script for debt
collectors, not only in leaving voicemails but also in their efforts to
contact consumers via a broad range of social media and new
communication technologies.2 13
The plaintiff in Zortman was employed by a debt collector and
owed roughly $650 on a credit card issued by Kohl's Department
Store.214 When she failed to pay, her account was referred to J.C.
Christensen & Associates, Inc. ("JCC") for collection. 215 A JCC debt
collector left a message on her cellphone's voicemail account stating
"[w]e have an important message from J.C. Christensen & Associates.
This is a call from a debt collector. Please call 866-319-8619."1216
Unbeknownst to JCC, Ms. Zortman regularly loaned her cellphone to
her children for use outside the home.2 17 Her children listened to the
message, then asked their mother if something was wrong, forcing her
to reveal the family's financial instability.218 MS. Zortman, claiming
this revelation resulted in emotional distress and loss of sleep, sued
JCC for violating the FDCPA's prohibition against third-party
communications.219
This was not JCC's first time in court. In its 2009 holding in Mark
v. J. C. Christensen & Associates, Inc.,220 the same court denied the
collector's motion for judgment on the pleadings when the plaintiff
alleged the collector violated mini-Miranda on facts similar to those
in Foti.2 1 Most of the Mark opinion focused on rejecting JCC's
argument challenging the Voicemail Paradox's constitutionality.22 2
211. 870 F. Supp. 2d 694 (D. Minn. 2012).
212. See id. at 707-08.
213. Id. at 705 ("The Court concludes that the messages left by JCC on Zortman's
voicemail do not constitute 'communications' with a person other than the consumer.").
214. Id. at 695-96.




219. Id. at 695-96.
220. No. 09-100, 2009 WL 2407700 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2009).
221. See id. at *9 (denying JCC's motion for judgment on the pleadings).
222. Id. at *4-8. JCC argued the alleged Hobson's Choice created by the Act's relevant
provisions is an unreasonable, content-based restriction on commercial speech that could
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However, the Mark court's opinion departed from Foti and its
progeny in one crucial respect: while most other courts have agreed
this so-called "Paradox" makes it exceedingly difficult-perhaps
impossible-for collectors to leave voicemails without violating the
FDCPA, Mark suggested there may not be a dilemma after all.223
Based on a federal district court decision (in a non-Paradox case)
weighing violations of the FDCPA and analogous California law, the
Mark court posited that Congress's original intent in barring third-
party communications applied only to "messages, deliberately
intended [to be] heard by third parties ... as a method of
embarrassing the consumer, not to protect against the risk of an
inadvertent disclosure that could occur if another person
unintentionally overheard the messages." 2 4 In other words, the court
indicated JCC could avoid the Paradox entirely and leave FDCPA-
compliant voicemails so long as it had no deliberate intention that (or
reasonable basis to suspect) they might be overheard by third
parties.22
JCC's Zortman brief makes clear it relied heavily on Mark in
designing its script for future voicemails.226 In 2011, the collector
moved for dismissal, arguing that because its voicemail was not
deliberately intended as a third-party communication about a debt, it
had complied with Mark's requirements and thus avoided triggering
section 1692c(b) liability.227 In denying the collector's motion to
dismiss, the court emphasized that the language JCC relied on from
Mark was merely dicta that bore no effect on the outcome of that
not survive strict scrutiny and therefore violated the First Amendment. Id. at *4.
Furthermore, JCC contended the Voicemail Paradox subverts Congressional intent by
potentially rendering any sort of attempt to contact a consumer via telephone illegal. Id. at
*6. For more details on this slippery-slope argument, see supra note 181.
223. Mark, 2009 WL 2407700, at *5.
224. Id. (citing Joseph v. J.J. Mac Intyre Cos., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1164 (N.D. Cal.
2003)).
225. See id. ("The risk of disclosure to third parties here was minimal.").
226. See Brief for Defendant, Zortman v. J.C. Christensen & Assocs., Inc., 819 F. Supp.
2d 874 (D. Minn. 2011) (No. 10-03086), 2010 WL 6530512. In its brief, JCC irately
bemoans being hauled back into court by the same plaintiff's attorneys for a violation
incurred by following the court's instructions, essentially arguing the new lawsuit
amounted to a bait-and-switch, based on frivolous hyper-technicalities. Id.
227. Zortman, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 877. JCC also relied on a 1988 FTC advisory opinion
suggesting a collector should not be held liable for section 1692c(b) violation if he had no
reason to anticipate an eavesdropper might overhear. Id. at 880 (citing Statements of
General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary On the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,104 (FTC Dec. 13, 1988)).
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case228 and conflicted with the FDCPA's strict liability standard, the
Act's statutory definitions, and the vast majority of Voicemail
Paradox holdings.229 In short, Mark had never intended to establish a
legally binding loophole for exempting collectors from liability, which
meant that although JCC may not have intended for a third party to
overhear its voicemail, it assumed the risk of an FDCPA violation by
leaving one.230 However, just as in Mark, in denying the motion to
dismiss, the Zortman court also offered JCC something of a
consolation prize, once again leaving the door open for further
argument over what it takes to trigger section 1692c(b) liability. In a
footnote, the court described what it characterized as a circuit split
over exactly how much information a collector must convey about a
debt in order to violate the prohibition against third-party
communications.23 1 It also requested the parties supplement their
briefs to address the issue.232
In its supplemental brief, JCC argued its voicemail was not a
communication because it did not name the plaintiff and thus did not
provide sufficient information to convey that she specifically owed a
debt.233 The court rejected this argument because JCC was unable to
228. Zortman, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 877-78. As the court explained, "Mark held that
certain semi-anonymous messages violated the FDCPA because the messages did not
include certain disclosures; it is a logical error to conclude that this holding implies that
messages with the disclosures will be necessarily in compliance with the FDCPA." Id. at
877 (emphasis added).
229. Id. at 880. As the court noted, while certain FDCPA provisions do include an
intent element for liability to ensue, those provisions explicitly state that requirement. Id.
at 879. However, there is no intent requirement stated in section 1692c(b). Id. And, as the
same court would note in its ultimate resolution of the case, "The FDCPA is a strict
liability statute and is liberally construed to protect consumers." Id. at 879 (citing Picht v.
Jon R. Hawks, Ltd., 236 F.3d 446 (8th Cir. 2001)).
230. See id. at 881 (denying JCC's motion).
231. Id. at 878 n.4. The court cites Horkey v. J.V.D.B. & Associates, 333 F.3d 769 (7th
Cir. 2003), in which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld liability for a wide range
of FDCPA violations for a collector who called a consumer at work repeatedly. See
Horkey, 333 F.3d at 771. At the district level, the court had dismissed the plaintiffs
allegation of a section 1692c(b) violation when the collector told her co-worker (who
answered her phone and said she was not available) to tell her to "quit being such a
[expletive] bitch." Horkey v. J.V.D.B. & Assocs., Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 861, 864 (N.D. Ill.
2002). Since the collector mentioned neither the debt nor identified himself as a debt
collector, the district court dismissed the charge. Id. at 868. The plaintiff did not appeal
that result, and the Seventh Circuit did not review it; however, the appellate court paused
to note it conflicted with cases in other circuits where courts had found liability on similar
facts. Horkey, 333 F.3d at 774 n.2.
232. See Zortman v. J.C. Christensen & Assocs., 870 F. Supp. 2d 694, 703 (D. Minn.
2012) ("The Court, therefore, requested supplemental briefing on whether the voicemails
left by JCC were communications.").
233. Id. at 704.
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cite any relevant precedents to support it.234 Nonetheless, it also
rejected Ms. Zortman's argument that voicemails are like postcards,
which are considered a communication under the Act and are
specifically prohibited.235 In doing so, the court seemingly adopted
JCC's premise, emphasizing that unlike a postcard, this voicemail did
not identify the plaintiff by name.236 Unsatisfied with either party's
analysis, the court embarked on its own.
It began by citing U.S. Representative Frank's House Resolution
4101'so-which it characterized as "explicitly" permitting collectors to
leave voicemails-and noting that both Congress and the FTC
"recognized the need to effectively transmit messages from debt
collectors to consumers [and] acknowledge[d] and accept[ed] the
possibility of communicating with certain third parties to effectuate
such message transmission." 239 Next, the court compared the message
JCC left on Ms. Zortman's cellphone with voicemails that were ruled
section 1692c(b) violations in other jurisdictions. It emphasized that a
common theme throughout those messages was that they "did more
than merely identify the caller as a debt collector-the messages also
identified the intended recipient of the message, revealed that the
intended recipient owe[d] a debt, or both."24 The court also cited two
cases in which collectors were not found liable because their
voicemails did not specifically mention that a collector was calling or
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. The court also asserted the risk that a third party might see a postcard is higher
than the risk of overhearing a voicemail. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 698 ("A 'clarifying' bill has been introduced by Representative Barney
Frank, but its fate is uncertain as of this writing."). After Zortman was handed down,
Frank's bill was quashed. See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
239. Zortman, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 698-99. In support, the court cited section 1692b's
exceptions that allow collectors to contact third parties in pursuit of location information.
Id. at 701. The court also cited a 1988 FTC advisory opinion that posited collectors could
communicate with certain third parties-such as telephone operators or telegraph clerks-
"if the only information given is that necessary to enable the collector to transmit the
message to, or make the contact with, the consumer." Id. at 698 (quoting Statements of
General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary On the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,104 (FTC Dec. 13, 1988)).
240. Id. at 700 (citing Branco v. Credit Collection Servs. Inc., No. S-10-1242, 2011 WL
3684503 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011); Valentine v. Brock & Scott, PLLC, No. 09-CV-2555,
2010 WL 1727681 (D.S.C. Apr. 26, 2010); Leahey v. Franklin Collection Serv., Inc., 756 F.
Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ala. 2010); Berg v. Merch. Ass'n Collection Div., 586 F. Supp. 2d
1336 (S.D. Fla. 2008)).
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that a specific consumer owed a debt.241 By the Zortman court's logic,
JCC's voicemail fell somewhere in-between: although JCC identified
itself as a collection agency and provided a callback number, it never
explicitly referenced the existence of a debt or the name of the
alleged debtor. This, the court reasoned, was really no more
information than would be available had the collector simply hung-up
instead of leaving a message, given the widespread availability of
caller-identification technology.242
Ultimately, this analogy proved determinative, given what the
court characterized as two "key inferences" a third-party listener
would need to make in order for the voicemail to satisfy the statutory
definition of "conveying information regarding a debt."243 For
starters, since the voicemail did not mention the plaintiff by name, a
third-party listener could not know for certain that Ms. Zortman
allegedly owed a debt without first assuming she was the message's
intended recipient.2" But, the court cautioned, such assumptions
could easily prove erroneous because
the number might have been dialed in error. The debt collector
might have wrong or outdated information about the owner of
the number it dialed. In a world where wrong numbers are a
fact of life, the unintended third-party listener would
understand that one possible explanation for the message he or
she overheard might be a wrong number. Nothing in JCC's
message removed that possibility.245
Furthermore, in order for JCC's voicemail to alert a third-party
listener that a debt existed, he would next have to assume "that the
only reason a debt collector calls is to collect a debt."246 The court
then speculated as to other plausible reasons a collector might have
called Ms. Zortman, including, for instance, that because she worked
for a debt collector, the call could have been work-related. 247
241. Zortman, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 705-06 (citing Koby v. ARS Nat'l Servs., Inc., No.
09CV0780, 2010 WL 1438763, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2010); Biggs v. Credit Collections,
Inc., No. CIV-07-0053-F, 2007 WL 4034997, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 15, 2007)).
242. Zortman, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 703.
243. Id. at 704. As the court subsequently explained, "Inferences or assumptions by an
unintended listener are not 'indirect communications' [under the Act]." Id. at 705.
244. Id. at 705.
245. Id. at 704.
246. Id. at 705.
247. Id.
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Moreover, under the FDCPA, "[a] hang-up call is not a
communication." 248 Nor, the court posited, is it an inference made by
a third party (based on a hang-up or its functional equivalent). 24 9 As
justification, the court supplemented the Act's statutory definition of
the term, noting "communicating is an intransitive verb defined in the
Merriam-Webster Dictionary as 'to transmit information, thought, or
feeling so that it is satisfactorily received or understood.' "250 In this
view, communication does not occur unless a message is actually
received. But if the message provides no more information to a third
party than would already be available through caller-ID after a hang-
up call, then it is not a communication either.2 s' Thus, the court held
JCC was not liable for violating section 1692c(b) and indicated that in
the future, debt collectors who leave similar voicemails that only
identify the collector, a callback number, and the fact the call was
placed in connection with collecting a debt will not run afoul of the
FDCPA (at least in the District of Minnesota).25 2
The court justified its decision by warning that to hold otherwise
would only make things worse for consumers. If debt collectors are
forbidden from leaving voicemails, they might resort to even more
abusive or annoying measures, such as repeated hang-ups and redials
from anonymous phone numbers2 3 Even worse, such a precedent
might risk eventually prohibiting collectors from using telephones
248. Id. at 706. The court cited a string of cases holding no liability for violating mini-
Miranda by collectors who hung up instead of leaving voicemails because a hang-up call is
not considered a "communication" under the FDCPA. Zortman relied on other federal
district court cases that have addressed unanswered or "hang up calls." See id.; see also
Worsham v. Acct. Receivables Mgmt., Inc., No. JKB-10-3051, 2011 WL 5873107, at *3 (D.
Md. Nov. 22, 2011) (unanswered call); Hicks v. America's Recovery Solutions, LLC, 816
F. Supp. 2d 509, 513 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (collector hung up); Wilfong v. Persolve, LLC, No.
10-3083, 2011 WL 2678925, at *4 (D. Or. June 2, 2011) (unanswered call).
249. Zortman, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 705.
250. Id. at 706 (emphasis added) (quoting Cozmyk v. Prompt Recovery Servs., Inc., 851
F. Supp. 2d 991, 994 (S.D. W. Va. 2012)).
251. Id. at 706.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 707. As the court noted, while section 1692d(5) bars collectors from
repeatedly calling consumers, that provision is only violated if the collector places those
calls with the specific intent to harass or annoy. Id. As a result, many courts have declined
to find violations even when the volume of calling is massive. Id. This would not only
annoy consumers, it would also violate customary expectations about proper manners.
Here, the court cites Emily Post's Etiquette guidebook as authority for the proposition that
it is rude not to identify oneself when placing a phone call. Id. at 706-07 (citing PEGGY
POST, EMILY POST's ETIQUETTE 224,226 (18th ed. 2011)).
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altogether. The thinking here is that if a voicemail that reveals no
more than a caller-ID display after a hang-up violates the Act's bar
against communicating with third parties, and collectors are barred
from scrambling their caller-ID displays,255 then collectors might
someday also be held liable for breaching section 1692c(b) just
because a third party happened to glance at a consumer's caller-ID
history.256 This, in turn, would violate Congress's intent and deprive
consumers of important opportunities to negotiate settlements, avoid
litigation, or even become aware of their alleged debts.257 Therefore,
the court concluded, "interpreting § 1692c(b) to prohibit voicemail
messages that merely identify the caller as a debt collector and leave a
return phone number does not favor the consumer."258
C. What Zortman Means (and Why It Was Wrongly Decided)
In the aftermath of Zortman, debt collectors are cautiously
optimistic that they may have finally found the perfect script for
solving the Voicemail Paradox. 259 While it remains to be seen whether
its holding persuades courts outside the District of Minnesota, if other
courts do find Zortman's reasoning persuasive, it would carve out a
gaping loophole in the Act, essentially enabling an end-run around
Foti.260 This would have the unfortunate side effect of undermining
the privacy interests protected by the intersection of mini-Miranda
and the FDCPA's bar on third-party communications. It would also
be bad law.
Zortman is susceptible to a wide range of criticisms. Its holding
stands in stark contrast to the results in the vast majority of post-Foti
cases and overstates the support for its implicit premise that surely
there must be some way debt collectors could be allowed to leave
voicemails. For example, the 1988 FTC opinion the Zortman case
254. Id. at 706 ("Such an interpretation would effectively remove the telephone as a
means of communication and the Act explicitly allows telephone calls from debt
collectors.").
255. Id. at 702 (citing Knoll v. Allied Interstate, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 943 (D. Minn.
2007) (holding scrambling caller-ID displays violates section 1692e's prohibition on
deception and misrepresentation)).
256. See Zortman, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 703.
257. See id. at 707.
258. Id. As the court summarized, "The messages at issue here did not identify a
consumer. They did not identify a debt. They conveyed no more information than would
have been obvious in caller ID or could have been acquired in a simple internet search for
the caller's phone number." Id. at 707-08.
259. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
260. Even if Zortman is not widely adopted, its holding still illustrates the perils of
leaving our patchwork federal judiciary to oversee the FDCPA's evolution.
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cites is narrowly focused on collectors' interactions with telegraph
clerks and phone operators in an effort to obtain location information
about consumers, rather than directly with consumers.261 Likewise,
while true that the Frank bill would have allowed collectors to leave
voicemails, those messages would have to be approved by the CFPB,
which the bill authorized to set guidelines based on its interpretation
of the law.262 In doing so, the bill left open the possibility the Bureau
might conclude Foti and its progeny were correct-that there really is
no way for a debt collector to leave an FDCPA-compliant message.26 3
Moreover, Frank later amended his bill to explicitly state it was not
intended to create a loophole.2" And in any case, the bill ultimately
died in committee.265
At times, the Zortman opinion seems to be an attempt to solve a
problem that does not exist yet, one that arises in large part from the
court's flawed analogy to hang-up calls and its overly credulous
acceptance of JCC's dire slippery slope arguments. Neither the
Voicemail Paradox in general nor the specific facts of this case
required the court to save debt collectors' right to make phone calls.
Yet the court was still gravely concerned and, after assuming that
JCC's voicemail is the functional equivalent of a hang-up call, it cited
cases finding violations of the Act's bar against deceptive and
261. Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary On the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,104 (FTC Dec. 13, 1988). In its
current form, the Act allows exceptions from liability to collectors seeking location
information from non-consumer third parties. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1692b (2012)
(providing exceptions for location information but requiring collectors to follow several
precautionary measures to avoid disclosing the existence of a debt). It could be argued
that when a collector calls a consumer for the first time and is confronted by an outgoing
answering machine message that does not specify the name of the phone number's
owner-as was the case in Zortman-he is still technically seeking location information
when he leaves his message, because he has not yet confirmed whether the consumer is
still using that number. See Zortman, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 696. However, such arguments
obscure congressional intent and the full context of those FTC opinions. A collector who
dials a telephone operator in search of a consumer's phone number is clearly and
intentionally contacting a third party, but can the same be said of a collector who dials the
consumer's last known phone number as listed on her credit application?
262. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Clarification Act of 2012, H.R. 4101, 112th
Cong. § 3 (2012).
263. See id.
264. Fair Debt Collection Practices Clarification Act of 2012, H.R. 5794, 112th Cong.
§ 3 (2012) ("Nothing ... shall be construed as providing an exemption from liability based
on any rule, regulation, interpretation, advisory opinion, or approval made by any entity
other than the Bureau.").
265. See H.R. 5794 (112th): Fair Debt Collection Practices Clarification Act of 2012,
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr5794 (last visited Jan. 3,
2014).
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misleading representations by collectors who scrambled their caller-
ID displays to leave false numbers.2 ' However, this does not mean
collectors are required to display anything on caller-ID; as the court
admits, there is no authority holding collectors liable for third-party
violations based on caller-ID displays that reveal their true phone
numbers, nor is there any precedent mandating collectors' caller-ID
displays include their agency's name.267 If collectors are free not to
identify themselves in this way, it is premature to conclude that
barring the functional equivalent of a hang-up with caller-ID will
inevitably doom all future telephone conversations. As it stands, even
if collectors cannot leave voicemails, they still have plenty of means at
their disposal for contacting consumers, including-as pointed out in
Foti and widely accepted outside the District of Minnesota-in live
phone conversations, by mail, or in court.268
The court's decision to equate JCC's voicemail with a hang-up
call is equally problematic. While it is arguably true that the message
conveyed no more information than would be available via caller-ID,
the court ignores the fundamental differences in both how these two
separate kinds of calls convey information, and in what they require
of both the caller and the unintended listener. On the one hand,
leaving a voicemail obviously requires more action by the collector
than simply hanging up. And, in the case of a hang-up call, a third
party must actively perform several tasks before he knows a debt
collector was on the line: he must decide to check the caller-ID
display, which may only provide a phone number, which he then
would have to look-up, possibly via the Internet. These are quick and
easy actions, but they require a degree of agency that simply
overhearing a voicemail-often an entirely passive activity-does not.
Zortman's most glaring error, however, comes in its
consideration of the inferences an unintended third-party listener
would need to make to realize the voicemail at issue was left to collect
a debt. Here, the court largely ignores the standard by which FDCPA
violations are customarily judged. While the court is correct to note
that JCC's message contained less information about the existence of
a debt than the voicemails previously held as violations in other
266. Zortman, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 702-03 (citing Knoll v. Allied Interstate, Inc., 502 F.
Supp. 2d 943 (D. Minn. 2007)).
267. Zortman, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 703.
268. See Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 659 (2006); see also Berg v.
Merch. Ass'n Collection Div., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1344 (2008) (listing U.S. mail,
face-to-face contact, or real-time phone conversations as viable modes of communication).
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jurisdictions,269 scant precedent exists to support the notion that
violations should be measured on some sort of Goldilocks-style
continuum or "sliding scale" in which some messages provide too
much or too little information, but others are "just right."2 70 Rather,
FDCPA violations in the Zortman court's jurisdiction are determined
according to the unsophisticated consumer standard.271
It is certainly true that given her employment by a collection
agency, Ms. Zortman could reasonably be expected to understand the
intricacies of the Act's requirements, or at least the typical law-
abiding collector's standard practices.272 Nonetheless, it does not
logically follow that the same level of knowledge should be imparted
to the average American, let alone her children. The unsophisticated
consumer may be unaware of many things, but-at the risk of stating
the obvious-even the dimmest bulb in the bunch knows that debt
collectors are employed primarily to collect debts. JCC's voicemail
explicitly stated it was from a debt collector.2 Whatever inferences
someone with an advanced background in finance or collections
might make upon hearing it, the far more likely (perhaps even the
natural) inference here is that somebody-presumably the person
whose phone number was dialed-has not been paying her bills on
time.
This similarly undermines the court's emphasis on the fact that
JCC's voicemail did not identify Ms. Zortman by name.27 4 The
following thought-experiment illustrates why: assume that a third
269. See Zortman, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 706.
270. Moreover, the two cases cited as examples of voicemails held not to trigger
liability for communication about a debt are distinguishable from JCC's voicemail. In both
those cases, collectors' messages conveyed considerably less information than here. In
Koby v. ARS National Services, Inc., No. 09CV0780, 2010 WL 1437863, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal.
Mar. 29, 2010), the court held a voicemail was not a communication under the Act because
the collector only gave his own name and a callback number-unlike Zortman, the call
made no reference to the fact it was placed in connection with a debt. Meanwhile, Biggs v.
Credit Collections, Inc., No. CIV-07-0053-F, 2007 WL 4034997, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 15,
2007), dealt with an alleged mini-Miranda violation, but the court held the message was
too vague to be considered a communication because the collector did not identify his
agency or the existence of a debt. In addition, there was no suggestion anyone overheard
the voicemail. See id.
271. The Eighth Circuit, which includes the District of Minnesota, has adopted the
Seventh Circuit's revision of the Act's least sophisticated consumer standard. See Peters v.
Gen. Serv. Bureau, Inc., 277 F.3d 1051, 1055 (8th Cir. 2002) (applying an objective
"unsophisticated consumer test" when determining whether a debt collector's practices
are deceptive or misleading in violation of the FDCPA). However, as noted in Part I,
these two standards are essentially the same.
272. See Zortman, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 695.
273. Id. at 696.
274. See id. at 704, 707.
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party overhears two messages, both of which are substantially the
same as JCC's insofar as they provide a callback number and identify
the name of the person or company calling. However, the first
message is from the Raleigh News & Observer's subscriptions
department; the second is from a doctor who works in Duke
Hospital's oncology department. In the former case, the third-party
listener would likely infer the call was placed by a telemarketer whose
job it is to dial hundreds of numbers per day and thus has no direct
relationship with the message's intended recipient. In the latter case,
the same third-party listener would likely infer the message relates
directly to the intended recipient's health. In other words: different
people make business calls for different reasons, which usually relate
to their stated occupations. Some occupations imply a far more
personal connection than others. In this sense, debt collectors are
more like oncologists than newspaper salesmen. Put simply: had the
Zortman court applied the correct standard, JCC would have been
held liable for violating section 1692c(b).
The Zortman opinion does briefly reference the unsophisticated
consumer standard in rejecting the plaintiff's argument that JCC's
voicemail is best analogized to a postcard and conveyed information
about a debt by using language similar to the message left in Foti.275
The court concludes that the collector's description of the call as
"important" does not in and of itself convey information about a debt
to an unsophisticated consumer.276 While this is likely true, it also
illustrates how the court implicitly embraces the "materiality"
requirement the Seventh Circuit often applies in conjunction with its
unsophisticated consumer standard in measuring FDCPA
violations. 277 Although the Zortman court never explicitly mentions
materiality as a necessary condition for liability, its underlying
premise-that a third party can overhear a message that identifies a
collector and its connection with a debt but nonetheless does not
qualify as "communication" 278 -certainly reflects this position.279
275. Id. at 704. The court rejected Ms. Zortman's postcard analogy because the
voicemail did not identify her by name and because (the court asserted) the risk of a third
party overhearing a voicemail is lower than the risk a postcard could disclose the existence
of a debt. Id. Of course, the latter assertion is undermined by the facts of this case and also
by the fact that consumers under financial duress frequently share phones. See NCLC,
supra note 38, at 26, 186 (discussing shared phones).
276. Zortman, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 705.
277. For discussion of the materiality requirement, see supra Part I.B.
278. See Zortman, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 707.
279. As noted in Part I.B, the materiality requirement has no direct basis in the
FDCPA's text, and seemingly contradicts the Act's strict liability standard.
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While it may be tempting to dismiss Zortman as a wrongly
decided outlier with no binding authority beyond its own jurisdiction,
the case itself exemplifies collectors' strategies for exploiting the
inherently ragtag nature of the federal judiciary. While consumers
continue to prevail in most courts under a traditional application of
the FDCPA, when collectors manage to convince a court to narrow
their liability, their victories serve as precedents for future defendants
in other jurisdictions; considered cumulatively, this risks undermining
the Act's protections nationwide. Furthermore, Zortman not only
provides collectors with a script for leaving future voicemails, it also
potentially offers a blueprint according to which collectors might soon
contact consumers across a wide array of social media and new
technology. Indeed, some collectors are already licking their chops at
this possibility.280
Zortman dealt specifically with a cellphone voicemail, but that
fact was not determinative in the court's holding.28 1 Under Zortman, it
is permissible for a debt collector to leave a message for a consumer
so long as it does not specifically identify her by name or explicitly
state she owes a debt.282 This precedent would easily apply to
traditional landlines, but although the opinion is silent with regards to
other communication technologies, it could also be expanded to cover
emails, texts, and messages left via Facebook, Twitter, and [insert
whatever social media innovation comes next]. Of course, when it
comes to third-party communications, one could argue that social
media are much more like postcards-which the FDCPA specifically
bans-than voicemails, insofar as they can easily be viewed by the
general (online) public. But by Zortman's reasoning, the debt
280. See, for example, Text Messaging Debtors, INSIDEARM.COM (June 11, 2012,11:59
PM), https://www.insidearm.com/forum/topic/text-messaging-debtors/, a recent discussion
from collection industry website insideARM.com's message boards, which illustrates how
collectors are speculating that all it takes to comply with the FDCPA when leaving
messages via new/social media after Zortman is to avoid naming the specific consumer.
281. See Zortman, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 707-08. Ultimately, the court's reasoning rests not
on the context of how the message was communicated but the content of the message
itself:
Prohibiting voicemail messages, like those left by JCC that provide no more
information than would be available through caller ID, does not directly advance
the interests Congress set out to protect in the FDCPA. The messages at issue
here did not identify a consumer. They did not identify a debt. They conveyed no
more information than would have been obvious in caller ID or could have been
acquired in a simple internet search for the caller's phone number. Under these




NO COUNTRY FOR VOICEMAILS
collector who posts a message on Bill Smith's Facebook wall may
only be searching for location information for another person, or
maybe he simply messaged the wrong Bill Smith. In either case, the
collector has only conveyed as much information as would be
available after a hang-up call, which means he has not
"communicated" about a debt under Zortman, and therefore he is not
liable for violating section 1692c(b), no matter how many third parties
view his message. While this would no doubt delight debt collectors
by providing a cheap and efficient way to contact consumers, it would
be bad news for the American consumer.283
In that sense, Zortman threatens the privacy interests protected
by the Voicemail Paradox in particular and the FDCPA more
broadly. The court claims to be rescuing consumers from more
annoying alternatives, such as an onslaught of anonymous hang-ups
and incessant redials, which might ensue if voicemails are
prohibited.2 " Yet the fact that the Act allows such conduct by debt
collectors only suggests the need for further reforms. And, if a
voicemail really is the functional equivalent of (and conveys no more
information than) a hang-up, that begs the question of just exactly
why leaving a voicemail would be necessary, or even useful, in the
first place.
It is possible that a voicemail could prompt the consumer to call
the debt collector back, which might help facilitate a settlement and
avoid litigation. But it is equally likely that call could result in
providing further opportunity for abuse and harassment. Remember
our friends Josh Horton285 and "Jimmy"? 286 Their experiences suggest
that when a debt collector calls a consumer, he is not necessarily
planning to engage in a polite discussion about how best to pursue
mutually beneficial interests and outcomes.2 To the contrary, they
illustrate that the FDCPA leaves plenty of grey area between what is
allowed and what is prohibited, which debt collectors regularly
exploit to more or less bully consumers in their efforts to make them
pay. For example, the Act prohibits collectors from using obscene
language or overtly threatening to harm consumers2 88 (whether
283. Indeed, some collectors already utilize social networking sites as "an important
tool" in the collections process. See Rende C. Lee, Got Debt? Better Watch What You Post
on Facebook, HOUSTON CHRON. (July 21, 2010), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl
/facebook/7118943.html.
284. See Zortman, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 707.
285. See Horton Interview, supra note 13.
286. See Halpern, supra note 59.
287. See supra Part I.
288. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (2012).
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physically28 9 or by revealing the existence of the debt to a third
party29 0), but it does not mandate the collector actually offer a
reasonable settlement or refrain from deploying more subtle
pressuring tactics. Furthermore, given section 1692d's intent
requirement,29 ' if the consumer decides not to answer the phone, the
collector can call him repeatedly, so long as the collector intends to
speak with him, rather than to annoy or harass him, even if the
natural consequence is to leave the consumer feeling as though he is
under siege.292 Allowing debt collectors to leave vague messages that
do not technically reveal the fact the recipient owes a debt-whether
via voicemail, or email, Facebook, or Twitter--only reinforces this
bullying dynamic. Whatever script the debt collector uses, the
message is clear: the "bad guys" know where you are, and they have
you surrounded, so you may as well talk to them.
Nothing in the FDCPA guarantees debt collectors the right to
speak with consumers. The Act merely allows them to utilize the
dominant technologies of the late-1970s to attempt to communicate
289. Id.
290. Id. § 1692c.
291. A collector may not cause a "telephone to ring or engag[e] any person in
telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass
any person at the called number." Id. § 1692d (emphasis added).
292. See, e.g., Clingaman v. Certegy Payment Recovery Servs., No. H-10-2483, 2011
WL 2078629, at *4, *5 (S.D. Tex. May 26,2011) (finding no FDCPA liability for a collector
that made fifty-five calls to a debtor over three and one-half months); Carman v. CBE
Grp., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1232 (D. Kan. 2011) (finding no FDCPA liability for a
collector that made 149 calls to a debtor over a two-month period); VanHorn v. Genpact
Servs., LLC, No. 09-1047-CV-S-GAF, 2011 WL 4565477, at *1, *5 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 14,
2011) (finding no FDCPA liability for a collector that made 114 calls to a debtor over a
four-month period). The Zortman court cites these cases to support its contention that "[a]
remarkable volume of telephone calls is permissible under FDCPA jurisprudence."
Zortman, 870 F. Supp. 2d 694, 707 (D. Minn. 2012). The court then speculates that
[ijf a person knows that he or she is being called by a debt collector, the FDCPA
provides an avenue for relief from the harassment-sending a letter telling the
collector to stop calling or informing the collector in writing that the consumer
refuses to pay the debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c). That option, even the possibility of
that option, is not available to a person who doesn't know that the persistent
anonymous caller is a debt collector.
Id. This is technically accurate, but it does not necessarily follow that the "favor" Zortman
claims to be granting is one most consumers would welcome. Perhaps it would be if we
presume all debt collectors scrupulously follow the spirit, rather than merely the letter, of
the FDCPA. But the same line of cases can just as easily be used to frame an argument
that debt collectors consistently seek to exploit whatever legal loopholes the law will
allow. Moreover, the court's rose-tinted optimism about how helpful allowing collectors to
leave voicemails will be to consumers ignores the sorts of typical collector/consumer
interactions detailed in Part I, as well as the privacy interests discussed in Part II.D.
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with alleged debtors, with certain restrictions and regulations.293
While the Act certainly should be updated to reflect contemporary
communication technologies and usage trends, it must also be
remembered that at its core, the FDCPA explicitly protects privacy
interests and implicitly sticks up for the consumer's right to be let
alone.
D. FD CPA, Privacy, and the Right to Be Let Alone
The FDCPA has always been intended to protect consumers
against invasions of privacy by debt collectors. This is explicitly stated
in the congressional findings and declaration of purpose that preface
the Act,294 and implicitly reflected across a wide range of the rules and
restrictions it codifies. Several of its provisions are designed to help
consumers exercise control over their personal and financial
information; section 1692c(b) is an obvious example,295 while related
provisions prohibit publishing the names of alleged debtors in order
to prevent debt collectors from shaming or coercing the consumer
into paying.296 More broadly, the Act regulates (and limits) how and
when debt collectors may communicate with consumers: while section
1692c(a) bars collectors from attempting contact at inconvenient
times and locations,297 section 1692d prohibits collectors from
threatening consumers or using profane language while
communicating with them. 298 Furthermore, section 1692d(5) outlaws
incessant calls intended to annoy or harass,299 and section 1692c(c)
provides a process by which consumers can order collectors to cease
and desist from future communications.30
These privacy protections are fundamentally rooted in what
Professor William L. Prosser famously identified as "the right to be
let alone."301 While Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis laid the
293. See § 1692.
294. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. For the statement of the FDCPA's
sponsor, see 122 CONG. REC. H7, 22,484, 22,499 (daily ed. July 19, 1976) (statement of
Rep. Annunio) ("The bill's controls on communications are quite reasonable and strike a
fair balance between the debt collector's need to contact and the consumer's right to
privacy and right to be free from harassment.").
295. See § 1692c(b) (restricting communication with third parties).
296. Id. § 1692d(3).
297. Section 1692c(a) prohibits telephone contact before 8 a.m. and after 9 p.m.; it also
bars collectors from calling a consumer at work if the collectors know or have reason to
know such contact violates the consumer's employer's rules. Id. § 1692c(a).
298. Id. § 1692d.
299. Id. § 1692d(5).
300. Id. § 1692c(c).
301. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
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foundations for treating individual privacy as a concept worthy of
legal protection with their influential 1890 essay, The Right to
Privacy,302 Prosser is widely and justifiably understood as the "chief
architect" of American privacy law.o3 The Warren and Brandeis
essay focused primarily on invasions of individual privacy by the
sensationalistic scandal-hungry media,3" and it spawned a diverse but
fractious array of new privacy-related causes of action across the
country.3 0  Decades later, Prosser's landmark 1960 essay
"systematized and organized [privacy] law, giving it an order and
legitimacy it had previously lacked," which allowed privacy to
become a "major topic in both academic and practical understandings
of tort law."30 6 Rather than a single all-encompassing right to privacy,
Prosser's taxonomy recognized "four distinct kinds of invasion of four
different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the
common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except
that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff, in
the phrase coined by Judge Cooley, 'to be let alone.' "307 In recent
years, legal scholars have argued that Prosser's famous but somewhat
derisive turn of phrase reflected a skepticism towards privacy torts
that is inherent in the analytic framework he created and may have
actually stunted the law's evolution.0
Regardless of Prosser's intentions, the notion of a "right to be let
alone" taps into a broader undercurrent that has powerfully
influenced the history of this country. The Framers implicitly codified
it in the Bill of Rights.3 09 Less than a decade after the publication of
302. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
303. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser's Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98
CAL. L. REV. 1887, 1888 (2010).
304. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 302, at 206 ("[T]he existing law affords a
principle which may be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual from invasion
either by the too enterprising press, the photographer, or the possessor of any other
modern device for recording or reproducing scenes or sounds.").
305. See Richards & Solove, supra note 303, at 1892-95 (discussing the slow evolution
of state privacy torts in the decades following publication of Warren and Brandeis's essay).
306. Id. at 1888.
307. Prosser, supra note 301, at 389 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT 19
(2d ed. 1888)).
308. See Richards & Solove, supra note 303, at 1890.
309. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X. The Third Amendment, for example, prohibits
quartering soldiers in homes during peacetime without the owner's consent. Id. amend.
III. The Fourth Amendment protects people, their homes, papers, and effects from
unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. amend. IV. The Fifth Amendment safeguards
individual autonomy even for criminals with its right against self-incrimination. Id. amend.
V.
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Prosser's essay, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized a
constitutional right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut,3 10 which
expanded in subsequent cases to protect individual autonomy against
interference from the state.311 Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted a
series of federal regulatory schemes to protect individual privacy,
including laws specifically aimed at safeguarding financial
information and transactions.312 Once again, the FDCPA is best
understood as a product of its times.
Although the Voicemail Paradox resulted from unforeseen shifts
in communication technology, Congress clearly contemplated the
interaction of its two prongs when it passed the FDCPA in 1977.313
While Zortman's holding most obviously undermines section
1692c(b)'s bar against communicating with third parties about a debt,
it also ignores the broader consumer privacy interests protected by
the FDCPA's mini-Miranda requirement. Foti illustrates mini-
Miranda's importance as an anti-fraud measure designed to prevent
debt collectors from deceiving misinformed consumers into
unintentionally revealing personal or financial information.314 But at a
more basic level, mini-Miranda protects privacy and individual
autonomy in much the same way as the Supreme Court's decision in
Miranda v. Arizona.31 5 While there are obvious and significant
differences between criminal interrogations and calls made to collect
debts, both situations revolve around magic words-"you have the
right to remain silent" and "this is a call to collect a debt"-designed
to alert the intended listener that he has an important choice to make.
Miranda warnings protect a suspected criminal's autonomy by
informing him that despite the inherently coercive atmosphere of a
police interrogation, he still has the choice to stand on his rights, say
nothing, and take his chances at trial. 6 In a far less (criminally)
310. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
311. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
312. See, e.g., Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2006)); Right to Financial Privacy Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (2012));
Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a (2012)); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), Pub. L. No.
93-380, 88 Stat. 571 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232 (2012)); Fair Credit
Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681 (2012)).
313. Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012)).
314. See Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
315. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
316. See id.
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consequential but still related vein, mini-Miranda warnings inform a
consumer both who is trying to communicate with him and why. The
warnings signal to him that the conversation he is about to have is
likely to be unpleasant and that the voice on the other end of the line
likely does not have his own best interests at heart. And-in
conjunction with section 1692c(c)'s cease-and-desist provision-the
warnings allow him to make an informed decision as to whether or
not this conversation will continue, at least until legal proceedings are
instigated against him. In short, they preserve his right to be let alone.
The trouble with the precedent established in Zortman is that now,
debt collectors can basically force consumers to make such intensely
private decisions in front of whoever else might happen to overhear
their voicemails (or even, if Zortman expands to allow similar contact
via social media, a public online audience).
III. HOW THE CFPB CAN PROTECT THE SHREWD, THE GULLIBLE,
AND THOSE WHO WOULD PREY ON BOTH BY PROHIBITING DEBT
COLLECTORS FROM LEAVING A MESSAGE AFTER THE BEEP
This Part argues that the CFPB can and should utilize its
authority to update the FDCPA and protect consumer privacy by
prohibiting debt collectors from leaving voicemails. First, Part III.A.1
details key structural factors that will assist the Bureau in achieving
its core mission of protecting consumers. Next, Part III.A.2 focuses
specifically on the CFPB's authority over the FDCPA, highlighting its
rulemaking power as a crucial advantage that will enable the Bureau
to succeed where the FTC previously fell short, while also detailing
the measures the Bureau has taken so far to expand the scope of the
Act's protections. Finally, Part III.B summarizes the justifications for
barring collectors from leaving voicemails and describes the benefits
such a straightforward, pragmatic utilization of the Bureau's authority
will entail.
A. There's a New Sheriff in Town
1. A New Breed of Consumer Watchdog
The Dodd-Frank Act transferred authority over the FDCPA to
the newly created CFPB.317 While the CFPB only recently took up the
317. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010).
680 [Vol. 92
2014] NO COUNTRY FOR VOICEMAILS 681
task of updating the Act,s18 there are early indications that the Bureau
will adopt a more aggressive stance in its efforts to protect American
consumers against abuse, harassment, and invasions of privacy by
debt collectors.3 19
On the one hand, the CFPB boasts key structural advantages
that insulate it against the threat of regulatory capture and thereby
insure the Bureau remains autonomous.32 0 Importantly, its funding is
not dependent on congressional approval, which (theoretically)
increases the Bureau's independence and decreases the ability of
lobbyists and interest groups to influence consumer protection
policies through the legislative process.3 21 Instead, the CFPB functions
as an independent bureau within the Federal Reserve System.
However, the Federal Reserve Board ("FRB") is prohibited under
Dodd-Frank from interfering with the Bureau's regulatory activities
and has no power to appoint or remove any of its employees. 22 As a
result, the CFPB has assembled a staff of seasoned regulators and
dedicated consumer protection attorneys to fulfill its mission of
creating "the strongest consumer financial protections in history"3 23
and functioning as a new kind of "consumer watchdog with just one
job: looking out for people-not big banks, not lenders, not
318. See CFPB, supra note 40, at 3. When the Bureau released its first annual report on
the FDCPA in 2012, it noted, "[Our] program to administer and enforce the FDCPA has
only just begun." Id.
319. See infra notes 331-44 and accompanying text.
320. See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Services Industry's Misguided
Quest to Undermine the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REv. BANKING & FIN.
L. 881, 902 (2012).
321. See id. at 885. wilmarth points out that the Bureau's autonomy, in terms of
funding, contrasts starkly with other federal regulatory agencies like the SEC and CFTC,
which do rely on Congressional funding and have been neutralized (and neutered) in their
attempts to regulate the financial sector as a result of the legislative appropriations
process, which financial institutions and trade groups have exploited to slash their budgets
for implementing regulations that would jeopardize industry profits. Id.
322. Id. at 903--04 ("Title X [of Dodd-Frank] prohibits FRB from taking any of the
following actions: (i) intervening in any CFPB examination, enforcement action or other
proceeding; (ii) appointing, directing or removing any CFPB officer or employee; (iii)
combining CFPB or any of its functions with any other FRB unit; (iv) reviewing,
approving, or delaying any CFPB rule or order; or (v) reviewing or approving any
legislative recommendations, testimony, or comments of CFPB's Director.").
323. President Barack H. Obama, Remarks on Signing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-
consumer-protection-act [hereinafter Presidential Dodd-Frank Statement].
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investment houses-looking out for people as they interact with the
financial system."3 24
Relatedly, the Bureau's internal structure offers an additional
reason to believe it will prove uniquely effective when compared to
other federal regulatory agencies. Specifically, the CFPB is headed by
a single director, who "may issue rules, orders and guidance 'to
administer and carry out the purposes and objectives of the Federal
consumer financial laws, and to prevent evasions thereof.' "325
Moreover, "[u]nlike agencies charged with writing rules to protect
health and the environment, the Bureau's rulemaking is not subject to
review by the White House's Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs."326 While these provisions potentially allow for a great deal of
independence-and clearly alarmed pro-business groups and their
allies in Congress, who opposed Dodd-Frank's implementation and
lobbied to weaken the Bureau after its passage by warning of
unprecedented bureaucratic interference that would stifle innovation
and harm businesses and consumers alike 327-they come with an
important caveat, namely: "The bureau cannot operate without a
director. Under the Dodd-Frank law, most of its regulatory powers-
particularly its authority over nonbanks like finance companies, debt
collectors, payday lenders and credit agencies-can be exercised only
by a director." 328 Thus, Senate Republicans seeking to undermine the
CFPB's authority refused to allow a confirmation vote on President
Obama's nominee to head the Bureau until July 2013, when Director
Richard Cordray was finally confirmed as part of a larger deal
approving several other previously filibustered executive branch
nominees.329 Consumer advocates hailed the news, noting that
324. Wilmarth, supra note 320, at 882 (quoting Presidential Dodd-Frank Statement);
see also Rob Blackwell, How the Specter of Regulatory Capture Shaped CFPB's First Year,
AMERICAN BANKER (July 10, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_131/how
-specter-regulatory-capture-shaped-cfpb-first-year-1050723-1.html (detailing the Bureau's
early evolution and the measures taken to preserve its independence).
325. Wilmarth, supra note 320, at 901-02 (quoting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1022(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1980 (2010)).
326. Melissa B. Jacoby, Dodd-Frank, Regulatory Innovation, and the Safety of
Consumer Financial Products, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 99, 106 (2011).
327. See Wilmarth, supra note 320, at 886-90.
328. Editorial, Quietly Killing a Consumer Watchdog, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 2013, at
A18.
329. See Jonathan Weisman & Jennifer Steinhauer, Senators Reach Agreement to Avert
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although the Bureau had been up and running for over two years,
without a director, "its legal authority remained uncertain."330
2. Updating the FDCPA
As the Bureau noted in its inaugural "state of the FDCPA"
report, its powers under Dodd-Frank include the ability to "prescribe
rules with respect to debt collection; issue guidance concerning
compliance with the law; collect complaint data; educate consumers
and collectors; and undertake research and policy initiatives related
to consumer debt collection."331 In exercising these powers, the CFPB
has one crucial advantage over the FTC with regards to its
stewardship of the FDCPA. Unlike the FTC, which could bring
lawsuits to enforce the Act but had no power to issue legally binding
interpretations of its provisions,332 the CFPB has been vested with
both enforcement and rulemaking authority.3 This means the
Bureau is well positioned not only to take collectors to court when
they violate the law, but also to update the Act's provisions as
necessary to reflect changing conditions and provide clear legal
standards both collectors and consumers can rely on.
One of the Bureau's top priorities in taking over FDCPA
authority from the FTC is to make sure American consumers are
actually aware of the rights and remedies they are entitled to under
330. Binyamin Appelbaum, Vote Ushers in New Era in Oversight of Lending Practices,
N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/17/business/cordray-conf
irmed-as-head-of-financial-watchdog-after-long-wait.html?ref=consumerfinancialprotec
tionbureau.
331. CFPB, supra note 40, at 3.
332. See NCLC, supra note 38, at 102-03. While Congress originally provided the FTC
with enforcement authority, the Act is silent on the question of rule-making authority. As
demonstrated by the FTC's own recommendations in its 2009 "Challenges of Change"
report, that significantly impaired the agency's power to alter or update the Act's
provisions. See FTC, supra note 42, at viii, noting:
To address such concerns more quickly in the future, the FTC recommends that
Congress give the Commission the authority to issue rules under the FDCPA. The
Commission recommends that Congress empower the agency to issue rules to
address problems that exist today as well as to issue rules as necessary to combat
new issues and concerns as they arise.
Id.
333. Section 1022(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act empowers the CFPB to issue rules and
guidelines "to administer and carry out the purposes and objectives of the federal
consumer financial laws, and to prevent evasions thereof." Additionally, sections 1022(b)
and 1031(b) provide authority for issuing rules and regulations to prohibit "unfair,
deceptive, or abusive act[s] or practice[s]." Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1022(b), 1031(b), 124 Stat. 124 Stat.
1376, 1980,2005 (2010).
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the Act. To that end, the CFPB is using its website to publicize the
FDCPA's protections in an easy-to-understand and user-friendly
format that includes a new system for reporting complaints and
answering consumer questions directly."M While the Bureau has yet to
initiate any litigation in conjunction with its enforcement authority, in
2012 it filed amicus briefs in FDCPA-related appeals pending in the
Tenth" and Eleventh336 Circuits to challenge holdings by district
courts that could potentially erode the Act's protections.
In its first exercise of FDCPA rulemaking authority, the Bureau
announced its new "larger participant" rule in October 2012.337 This
rule expands the CFPB's authority to directly supervise larger debt
collectors, setting the threshold at $10 million in annual consumer
debt receipts.3 While this rule does not cover all collectors, the
Bureau estimates that those to whom it applies account for over sixty
percent of the collection industry's annual revenue.3 The rule's
announcement drew the ire of many collectors, who complained they
felt shut out of the process. The rule signals a more aggressive
334. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, www.consumerfinance.gov (last visited Jan.
3, 2014).
335. Brief for Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Plaintiff-Appellant, Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 668 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-
1363), 2011 WL 7144818. In Marx, the Bureau filed an amicus brief on behalf of a plaintiff
who filed suit after a collector sent a fax to her workplace to inquire about her
employment status and attempted to garnish her wages. Id.; Marx, 668 F.3d at 1176. The
consumer alleged her co-workers saw the fax, which violated the Act's bar against third-
party disclosures, but the lower court (employing logic similar to that in Zortman) held the
fax did not constitute a "communication" about a debt, and also awarded the collector
attorney's fees, despite no showing the suit was brought in bad faith (which the Act
requires). See Marx, 668 F.3d at 1176-78. In its amicus brief, the Bureau articulated strong
support for a broad interpretation of section 1692c(b)'s prohibition on third-party
communications. Brief for Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, at *11-12. Ultimately,
however, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the fax was not a
"communication" under the FDCPA and also upheld awarding attorney's fees to the
collector despite no showing of bad faith. Marx, 668 F.3d at 1184. The case was eventually
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which affirmed the trial court despite
another amicus brief the Bureau submitted with the United States. See Marx v. Gen.
Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166 (2013); Brief for the United States et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Marx, 133 S. Ct. 1166 (No. 11-1175), 2012 WL 3186580.
336. Brief for Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Birster v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 481 F. App'x 579, 580
(11th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-13574-G). The Birster court opinion was consistent with the
Bureau's argument that the scope of the FDCPA's protections against harassment and
abuse extend to calls concerning mortgage foreclosure proceedings. Birster, 481 F. App'x
at 580, 583.
337. See Defining Larger Participants of the Consumer Debt Collection Market, 77
Fed. Reg. 65,775, 65,777 (Oct. 31, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1090).
338. Id. at 65,777.
339. CFPB, supra note 40, at 12-13.
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regulatory posture and suggests the CFPB -(accurately) views
collectors less as cooperative partners in regulation than as frequent
offenders whose violations of the FDCPA must be deterred.34 0
More recently, in July 2013, the Bureau took further steps to
protect consumers from abuses resulting from gaps in the FDCPA's
coverage. Specifically, because the Act itself only applies to debt
collectors, its provisions previously did not apply to lenders who
sought to collect on their own.34 1 "As a result, the lenders-from
national banks like Capital One to big department stores like
Macy's-can hound consumers behind on their bills with repeated
calls, even though the practice is restricted by the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act." 342 To close this loophole, the Bureau issued
a bulletin citing Dodd-Frank's prohibition on unfair, deceptive, or
abusive acts or practices ("UDAAPs") as justification for expanding
the scope of its regulatory authority, noting "[a]lthough the FDCPA's
definition of 'debt collector' does not include some persons who
collect consumer debt, all covered persons and service providers must
refrain from committing UDAAPs in violation of the Dodd-Frank
Act."3 43 Or, as Director Cordray put it more succinctly, "[i]t doesn't
matter who is collecting the debt-unfair, deceptive or abusive
practices are illegal." 3"
340. See, e.g., Gina McNaughton, How Engaged is the CFPB with the ARMIndustry?,
INSIDEARM.COM (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.insidearm.com/opinion/how-engaged-is-the-
cfpb-with-the-arm-industry/ ("[T]he mainstream perception of the CFPB is that they are
partnering with the financial services industry to better serve and protect consumers. The
reality is that while they may, or may not, be working with banks, lenders, and other
financial services providers, their partnership with the debt collection industry appears
almost non-existent. As you may be aware, the CFPB recently appointed the Consumer
Advisory Board (CAB) which was a part of the Dodd-Frank legislation. A review of the
Board Members selected shows most of the financial sectors are represented, except for
the ARM industry.").
341. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Edward Wyatt, US Vows to Battle Abusive Debt
Collectors, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2013, at B1 ("The primary federal law that governs how
companies pursue consumers behind on their bills does not apply to firms that are trying
to recoup money that they lent directly to a consumer.").
342. Id.
343. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, BULL. 2013-07, PROHIBITION OF UNFAIR,
DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE AcTs OR PRACTICES IN THE COLLECTION OF CONSUMER
DEBTS (2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201307-cfpb.bulletinunfair-
deceptive-abusive-practices.pdf.
344. Silver-Greenberg & Wyatt, supra note 341, at B1 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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B. Please Don't Leave a Message After the Beep
The CFPB should make use of its rulemaking authority to
resolve the Voicemail Paradox by prohibiting debt collectors from
leaving voicemails.35 Following common sense, the vast majority of
federal district courts, and the FDCPA's plain language, the Bureau
should declare that voicemails are communications under the Act.
Moreover, voicemails are an "inherently risky" form of
communication.346 Nothing in the FDCPA entitles debt collectors to
leave them. To the contrary, with its prohibition against sending
postcards, the Act expressly forbids collectors from communicating
with consumers in ways that risk disclosing the existence of a debt to
unauthorized third parties.3 47 A rule barring voicemails is directly
supported by the interplay of the section 1692c(b) and mini-Miranda
requirements. Such a rule would meaningfully update the privacy
protections those provisions embody to fit our contemporary
technological contexts.
This update would also help debt collectors by rescuing them
from themselves. By finally declaring voicemails impermissible, the
Bureau can clarify the law and eliminate the supposedly unresolvable
dilemma collectors claim to be confounded by, thereby removing the
potential for further lawsuits generated by their mostly unsuccessful
but persistent search for a legal loophole. Collectors will no doubt
complain that a categorical bar against voicemails inconveniences
them by restricting their ability to cheaply and efficiently
communicate with consumers. But the many who already refrain from
leaving voicemails to avoid violating the Act are still in business
because there are ample alternative means-such as by mail or live
telephone conversations-at their disposal for contacting debtors.
The slippery slope arguments that carried the day in Zortman are
345. Others have suggested resolving the Paradox by allowing collectors to leave
voicemails if a consumer provides written consent. See, e.g., Melissa Travis, The Three Cs
Versus the Dinosaur: Updating the Technologically Archaic FDCPA to Provide
Consumers, Collectors, and Courts Clarity, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1033 (2011).
However, it is difficult to imagine many consumers would freely choose to sign such
consents if they were accurately informed they had a right not to sign. On the other hand,
it is easy to envision such provisions being included on other forms consumers must sign,
buried beneath mountains of fine print and legal jargon, which would clearly defeat the
purpose of seeking consent in the first place. Moreover, it is likely such a solution could
lead to an even more confusing dilemma in which collectors are allowed to leave
voicemails for some consumers but not others, thereby sparking further litigation.
346. Berg v. Merchants Ass'n Collection Div., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1343 (S.D.
Fla. 2008)
347. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (2012).
[Vol. 92686
NO COUNTRY FOR VOICEMAILS
hyperbolic and unconvincing;m8 nonetheless, the Bureau can alleviate
concerns about preserving the ability to communicate via telephone
by also declaring that a caller-ID display by itself is insufficient to
trigger liability for violating section 1692c(b)'s third-party prohibition.
Furthermore, prohibiting debt collectors from leaving voicemails
protects consumers' privacy not only from the risk of third-party
disclosures but also more broadly by paying full respect to the Act's
mini-Miranda requirement. Remember, even following Zortman's
(strained) logic, voicemails are arguably unnecessary in the first place,
given the prevalence of caller-ID technology. If the message conveys
no more information than a hang-up call, what is its actual utility,
apart from further reinforcing the bullying dynamic these calls often
exhibit and extending an invitation for the consumer to call back for
further bullying?349 While the FDCPA does give collectors the right to
communicate with consumers via telephone, it does not guarantee the
consumer will actually speak to them; indeed, the Act provides
consumers with a way to cut off all further communication and take
their chances in court. Viewed in this light, the mini-Miranda
requirement plays a crucial role in preserving individual dignity and
autonomy by assuring that consumers are given the opportunity to
decide whether or not to engage in what are often unpleasant
conversations.
Prohibiting voicemails will not only resolve this paradox, it will
also set an important precedent for regulating how debt collectors are
allowed to communicate with consumers using email, text messages,
social media, and other new technologies. Whereas Zortman's logic
could potentially be extended to allow vague but revealing messages
that do not fit within a narrow interpretation of what constitutes
"communication" about a debt, a categorical ban against leaving
messages will help to preserve a broader definition of the term-one
348. See supra Part I.C.
349. This seems especially true in the context of cell phones, given the central role they
have come to play in many consumers' lives. (For further illustration: once you finish
reading this Comment, approach a close friend and clandestinely "borrow" his or her
cellphone; chances are within fifteen minutes of realizing its absence, your friend will be
on the verge of a nervous breakdown.). Phones are no longer just for talking, they now
allow us to pay our bills, read the newspapers, and communicate via email with specific
individuals or the general public. For better or worse, one's cellphone vitally impacts how
one perceives the world and presents oneself to it. Allowing debt collectors to leave
voicemails invades this virtual space and, by extension, individual privacy.
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the CFPB has already embraced'3 0-that better comports with
Congress's intention to prohibit most third-party communications.
In doing so, the Bureau will update the Act to reflect broader
trends relating to issues of privacy and new technology that have
emerged since its passage. Given the fact it has only heard three
FDCPA-related cases in over three decades since the Act's passage, it
seems unlikely the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to clarify the
Voicemail Paradox any time soon.35 ' But in its recent Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has reiterated the importance
of an individual's reasonable expectations of privacy with regards to
new technology. For example, in Ontario v. Quon,352 the Court
imported the framework established in Katz v. United States" to
decide whether or not a policeman's Fourth Amendment rights were
violated after he was disciplined for sending amorous non-work
related texts on his department-provided pager.354 Although the
Court ultimately found no violation-based largely on the
department's previous warnings to officers that the pagers were for
work purposes only and that any communications might be
monitored3 55-the case itself is noteworthy for its adoption of the
Katz test and suggests that in future new technology-related cases, an
individual's reasonable expectations of privacy will be a factor.356
Furthermore, Congress frequently regulates and restricts actors
who wish to communicate with consumers for commercial purposes
via phone, fax, and email. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA") restricts telemarketers,357 as does the Do-Not-Call
Implementation Act of 2003.58 Likewise, the CAN-SPAM Act of
2003 established guidelines restricting the use of email for mass-
marketing messages."' Interestingly, the TCPA now expressly
prohibits placing calls to consumers' cellphones via auto-dialing
350. See Brief for Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Plaintiff-Appellant, Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 668 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-
1363), 2011 WL 7144818.
351. Even if it did, the pro-collector holding in its 2013 Marx opinion might be seen as
an ill omen for consumers and their voicemail inboxes. Yet Marx was more about
attorney's fees and the rules of civil procedure than consumer privacy. Marx v. Gen.
Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166 (2013).
352. 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
353. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
354. Ontario, 130 S. Ct. at 2629-30.
355. Id. at 2630-32.
356. See id.
357. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012).
358. 15 U.S.C. § 6101.
359. Id. § 7701.
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technology without written consent; while the measure is aimed at
telemarketers, most debt collectors utilize the same technology and
are only allowed to call cellphones based on a controversial 2008
Federal Communications Commission ruling that concluded
consumers provide express written consent for such calls simply by
signing their names to a standard credit application.36
CONCLUSION
In light of the aforementioned judicial and legislative trends, and
the importance of the interests the FDCPA's provisions protect, it is
unlikely that a CFPB rule prohibiting debt collectors from leaving
voicemails would be struck down as unconstitutional or invalidated as
arbitrary and capricious. The Voicemail Paradox may not actually be
a paradox at all, but resolving it by prohibiting debt collectors from
leaving voicemails will honor the FDCPA's aim of shielding
consumers and their privacy from harassment and abuse by debt
collectors, thus protecting not only "the gullible as well as the
shrewd"36 1 but also those who would prey on both. We ought not
allow our necessary evils to be unnecessarily evil.
TIM HENDERSON**
360. See In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 23 FCC Rcd. 9779 (FCC June 17, 2008). The FCC's
ruling was challenged in Leckler v. Cashcall, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2008), in
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